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FOREWORD
This report is a design survey of the Apollo CSM stabilization and
control system and is part of the NASA Design Criteria Program. The
objective of the program is to provide a unification of design approaches for
the development of space vehicles and their major components. These sur-
veys are intended to document the design experience gained from specific
NASA projects and will be used as an aid in identifying suitable topics for
design criteria monographs.
This design survey was performed in accordance with the Statement
of Work in NASA Contract NAS12-603, "Apollo Stability, Guidance, and
Control Design Survey, " for the NASA Electronics Research Center Design
Criteria Office.
The material for this study was gathered, prepared, and documented
under the direction of the Program Manager, R.L. Peterson, and the Project
Engineer, F.B. Cauchon. Major sections of the report are the results of
the efforts of Messrs. M.F. Madden, E.J. Knobbe, and M.W. Kishi.
H.K. Watson wrote other sections of the report as well as aiding in the
understanding of the system and critical editing of the report. Personnel
now connected with the Apollo CSM/SCS, such as Messrs, W.B. Fours,
R.G. Epple, B.W. Johnston, and M. J. Stiles provided much needed
assistance.
The contractor's designation for this report is SD 68-869.
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i. 0 INTRODUCTION
This report presents a design survey summary of the Apollo Block II
stabilization and control system (SCS);!_ The report is divided into eight basic
areas to provide, first, an overview of the complete system and its integral
subsystems, their functions, mechanization, and any interesting or unique
features they may embody together with historical development where it
seems appropriate. Secondly, the report describes the design requirements
which were initially specified or which evolved with time and the various
design tradeoffs that were considered in finally arriving at a design baseline.
Thirdly, each of the eight areas are explored for the more significant prob-
lems which arose (those beyond the normal development type) and what
changes were effected to solve those problems. Finally, conclusions are
presented for each area which represents a synthesis of the experience
obtained during the course of this program.
The material presented herein was obtained from researching approxi-
mately 300 documents and in interviews with approximately 25 persons
intimately connected with the SCS program.
In researching the material for this report, it was difficult at times to
assess if a problem was one that indicated a design deficiency or something
that should be expected in the normal development and evaluation of any
complex system. Furthermore, the unusual length of the Apollo program,
seven years, tends to obscure the development problems and in some cases
the design problems.
To date, the SCS has operated successfully on all flights, which include
four unmanned Block I vehicles and one manned Block II vehicle. The
Apollo 7 flight is so recent that no specific SCS performance data are avail-
able for this report. Much of the success of this system can be attributed
to conservative design techniques, use of state-of-the-art components,
extensive developmeat, qualification, and acceptance testing, as well as
sophisticated hardware-in-the-loop simulation programs. The SCS is
manufactured by Honeywell, Inc., under contract to the Space Division of
North American Rockwell Corporation.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
Each major section of this report corresponds to the major subsystems
of the SCS. There are two additional sections that discuss the system as a
whole. Section 2.0 discusses the total system while Section 8.0 discusses
*See Appendix B for abbreviations and acronyms.
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the hardware design philosophy. Sections 3.0 through 7.0 discuss the opera-
tion of the subsystems and their requirements, and evaluate the major
changes, tradeoffs, and design problems encountered. Finally, these sec-
tions conclude with a discussion of hindsight or recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Two sets of recommendations were reached based on the results of
this study: (1) future program recommendations, and (2) additional study
recommendations. For future programs it is recommended that:
I, Firm baseline requirements be established before the start of
the hardware design process. Although this seems obvious,
the Apollo program was not conducted in this fashion.
Multiple source procurement be used for advanced design
approaches. Generally, state-of-the-art design approaches
should be adhered to. However, if this is not possible,
alternate sources of procurement should be examined to
prevent development problems of a supplier from slowing the
design of the total system.
, Firm specifications be provided for crew personal preference
items.
, The use of rigorous tolerance analyses to establish design and
test limits be utilized. Although most programs use some form
of tolerance analysis, the design experience for Spacecraft 101
(Apollo 7) indicates that this method should be of a rigorous nature.
The use of mathematical convolution in combining probability
density functions provides this rigor. In support of this activity,
manufacturers should provide component part performance
characteristics probability density functions.
Additional studies are recommended in the following areas:
i, Development of a failure analysis methodology to assist in the
identification of single-point failures. The present method is
the application of rr_any engineers to search diagrams for
problems, and is not altogether successful for complex systems.
. Development of an accurate low-g propellant slosh model. The
present model has produced some physically unreasonable results
in simulations, and predictions based upon it have not been con-
firmed by any of the previous Apollo flights.
-2-
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,
,
Reexamination of the thrust vector control (TVC) design concept
so it can be made less vehicle-parameter sensitive with the same
performance. Furthermore, a better way needs to be found to
determine the vehicle parameters, such as body bending.
Establishment of criteria and methods to obtain extended hardware
duration reliability. The long checkout times for complex space
vehicles, together with the extended duration of some missions,
put a premium on long-life operation of equipment.
-3-
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2.0 TOTAL SYSTEM DESIGN SURVEY
This section describes the design and evolution of the total SCS system.
Details of each subsystem are described in separate sections. The discus-
sion is primarily performance-oriented, and subjects such as reliability,
configuration control, quality assurance, etc., are treated in a separate
section.
The section reviews the purpose and requirements for the total system,
proceeds to the evolutionary development of the system, and includes the
major problems and changes. The problems discussed are the humidity
requirement change, the Block I electrical connectors, single-point failures
and relay failures. The major change was a redesign in June 1964; the
original SCS prior to that time was termed Block I and the redesigned SCS
subsequent to June 1964was termed Block II.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The function, operation, and design features of the SCS as a total
system are described herein. Individual sections of the report will elaborate
on the system characteristics in more detail. The SCS is an analog flight
control system whose primary purpose is to back up the functions of the
primary flight control mode. The SCS also provides interfacing equipment
between the command module (CM) computer, astronauts, and the spacecraft
thrusters.
Functions
The SCS provides the Apollo spacecraft with an analog backup flight
control capability. The primary system is provided by the primary guidance,
navigation, and control system (PGNCS), which is a digital system. The
SCS provides the electrical interface between command signals and the
service propulsion system (SPS) and the reaction jet control system (RCS)
thruster operations and visual displays of vehicle flight-control parameters.
In the manual control modes of operation, the SCS also provides a direct
electrical interface between manual input commands and the PGNCS command
module computer. As a backup system, the SCS performs all of the flight-
control functions of the PGNCS except automatic attitude maneuvers.
The SCS senses the three vehicle body rates, which are utilized for
control and display, generates and uses the three vehicle body attitudes,
-5-
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visually displays these parameters, generates and displays the three attitude
errors, provides direct control and display of SPS pitch and yaw gimbal
positions, provides setting and display of desired vehicle angular orientations,
generates and uses vehicle translation and rotation commands, and, when
used as the backup flight control system, processes (i.e., summing, shaping,
gains, etc.) all signals necessary to effect complete vehicle control.
Mechanization
The stabilization and control system consists of three major elements
(Figure Z-l)--the attitude reference subsystem, the flight control electronics,
and the controls and displays. The backup flight control inertial reference
capability is provided by six body-mounted attitude gyros (BMAG). Three
are used for attitude information and three are used in a rate mode for sensing
spacecraft rotational rate. Electronics are provided through the gyro display
coupler, to convert the BMAG information from body coordinates to Euler
angles for display to the crew. Each flight control mode, i.e., thrust vector
control, attitude, and entry control, has an automatic as well as a manual
mode of operation. The input signals to the electronics for these flight-
control modes are the attitude reference and the rotational hand controller
signals. Motion of the CSM is accomplished under command of the flight
control electronics through the use of the service module (SM) Z0,000-pound
thrust main engine for thrust vector control,through sixteen 100-pound SM
reaction jets for attitude control, and through twelve 100-pound CM reaction
jets during the entry control phase.
Display of the vehicle attitude rate and attitude error is provided by a
pair of flight director attitude indicators (FDAI's). Two hand controllers are
provided to command vehicle rotation and one hand controller for translation.
Control and display of the SPS engine gimbals are also provided. Figure 2.-2
is a photograph showinK the electronic equipment used for the SCS.
Design Features
The SCS has th_ following design features that are discussed in more
detail later in the report:
Euler angle generation - The use of attitude changes, rather
than rate data, to generate Euler angles by the attitude gyro
coupler unit (AGCU), Block I, and the use of rate data to generate
Euler angles by the gyro display coupler (GDC), Block II.
-6-
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Pseudo-rate feedback - A passive network that provides for the
control of attitude limit cycles well below the rate sensor thres-
hold and yet within the range of the reaction jets minimum
impulse capability.
Magnetic particle clutch actuator - The typical space actuator
is hydraulic whereas the Apollo main engine is actuated through
a magnetic clutch and an electric motor, thus doing away with
working fluids in a vacuum environment.
Manual thrust vector control (MTVC) - Early in the program it
was not considered feasible to have manned control of the SPS
because of the high acceleration levels possible with the SPS.
However, extensive simulations showed that the astronaut can
effectively control this system and MTVC is now the primary
method of main engine flight control failure takeover.
Multiple function display (GP/FPI) - The use of a display to
show two different quantities at different times in the mission
to save control paneI space.
Tolerance analysis program - The use of mathematically rigorous
summations of piece part probability density functions through
mathematical convolution techniques to determine design test
limits, thereby providing additional confidence in the system
flight operation.
DESIGN RE QUIREMENTS
Requirements
The mission performance design requirements that the system must
satisfy are presented below:
Mission Phase
Abort
Transearth flight
Requirement
Safe trajectory and orienta-
tion for reentry.
Total midcourse corrections
equal to or less than 300 ft/
sec in three or less burns;
not more than three RCS
corrections whose total is
less than 15 ft/sec.
SD 68-869
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Mission Phase
Transearth injection
Entry
Requirement
Delta V accuracy of one
degree rms.
No range control
requirement.
Block I Design Philosophy - In-Flight blaintenance
From early in the program until the major Block II change in
June 1964, the SCS was the primary method of flight control. The initial
Apollo proposal indicated the control system would also encompass a lunar-
landing capability. This, however, was eliminated when the lunar orbital
rendezvous concept was adopted by the NASA. As the primary method of
flight control, the system had to meet a high-reliability figure. This could
only be achieved through the use of in-flight maintenance (IFM). Despite
the best efforts of reliability and design engineers, the equipment mean
time between failures (MTBF) was of the same order of magnitude as the
mission time. Hence, the most feasible solution to the problem of main-
taining high systen_ reliability was to provide standby redundancy in the
form of onboard spares.
The Apollo proposal indicated that the basic stabilization and control
system would be designed on the basis of having the complete functional
system backed up with standby redundancy in the form of module level
spares. The crew, with the aid of simple checkout equipment, would be
able to detect malfunctions at the black box or module level and make the
necessary replacement. The mean time to repair (estimated at 30 minutes)
was thought not to be significant during the n_idcourse trajectory because
attitude disturbing torques are extremely small and correction could be
made after the system was restored to operation.
The control system _'eliability allocation for a 14-day mission was
0.995. The ground rules initially established for the system design were:
o Use the astronaut whenever possible to obtain increased
reliability throuzh system simplification.
2. Include in-flight test system self-check wherever possible.
. Design reliability into equipment by the use of high-reliability
parts, conservative part derating, circuit parameter and stress
anaIyses, and reliability prediction and control methods.
10-
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A variation in astronaut participation was effected because it was
anticipated that the crew members would make human errors. Ground rule
No. 1 was changed to have equipment designed to assist the crew members'
activities, which, in effect, would minimize the incidence of human error.
It was felt that there should be utilization of their capability to interpret and
evaluate indicators, exercise judgment, and make decisions; however,
manual or automatic troubleshooting should be used to help trace the cause
of the malfunction to a particular module or component. Near the end of
the IFM program, these ground rules were added:
. Fault isolation to the level of three replaceable subassemblies
with a semi-automatic test mode in the in-flight test system.
. Fault isolation to a level of one replaceable subassembly with
manual te st
. Maximum use made of SCS displays and controls for fault
isolation
4. Maintenance possible in or out of the pressure suit
5. Mean time to repair equal to 20 minutes in shirt sleeves.
In early 1963 the required weight of spares to achieve the mission
reliability of 0.995 was 70 pounds. With no spares the predicted reliability
was 0. 605. At the June 1964 design review, the required spares weight had
decreased to 44.4 pounds and the no-spare reliability was up to 0. 825.
At the time the Block II concept was being defined, in June 1964, the
in-flight maintenance requirement was deleted. Since the Block I earth orbital
reliability requirement is considerably less than that for the Block II lunar
trip, additional redundant circuits were not added to the Block I vehicles in
lieu of on-board spares. The Block II system was redesigned to include
redundant control paths.
In-flight mai_tenance was deleted for two reasons:
l. Practicality: although it was technically feasibie for the
astronaut to detect and replace the failed module, it was
not an easy task. For example, in the Control System
laboratory it was not unusuai for a trained technician to
take hours to locate and change a defective element. The
increased humidity requirement fixes, furthermore, made
the installation and removal of the boxes more difficult.
-11-
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Z. Block II:
system,
circuits,
the concept of Block II that made the SCS the backup
and repackaging the electronics to include redundant
eliminated the need for in-flight maintenance.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problems
There were four major problems encountered in the development of
the SCS that affected the system as a whole. These were humidity require-
ments, the Block I electrical connectors, single-point failures, and relay
failures. These problems are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Humidity
In the summer of 1963 the Mercury flight of NLA-9 experienced elec-
trical difficulties. These failures were traced to electrical shorts caused
by condensation resulting from an unexpectedly high humidity environment
of 40 to 70 percent relative humidity, and a temperature of 75 plus or minus
5 degrees F. On Apollo, these parameters are maintained by the environ-
mental control and life support system (ECLSS).
The ECLSS control is effectively limited to the atmosphere in the
cabin interior, i.e., in front of equipment panels. The atmosphere behind
the panels, in corners, or in protected pockets are beyond the direct con-
trol of the ECLSS. Water is removed through the suit circuit or with a
vacuum cleaner. If the teI_perature falls below the dew point (about
60 degrees F), condensation will occur. With low surface temperatures
and the absence of warm, moving air, condensation could be expected behind
panels and especially near cold spots. Areas near the umbilical, windows
in the forward equipment bay, and structural connections to cold walls were
particularly sensitive to spacecraft orientation with regard to condensation.
Condensation couhl be expected during approximately 40 percent of all
possible spacecraft orientations. After 4 to 5 hours of such orientation, the
cabin air may fall to 60 degrees F. Analysis indicated that condensed
moisture could be expected in and around the equipment located in the pres-
surized section of the command module even with the ECLSS operating
properly.
Based on these factors, it was decided to change the spacecraft equip-
ment relative humidity requirements to 100 percent during flight operation.
The SCS equipment for Block I was subsequently modified to withstand this
new requirement. The ground rules for the change were as follows:
-iZ-
SD 68 -869
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
. Existing in-flight maintenance requirements will be retained
in any redesign.
. Existing package envelope dimensions will be retained in any
redesign.
The nature of the changes took the form of backpotting and adding rubber
seals to the electrical connectors. Although this technically allowed the
in-flight maintenance concept to remain, the practicalities of changing the
spares was made very difficult. The Block I system never did fail humidity
testing during qualification testing or actual flight. The change in humidity
requirements was, however, a major factor in the BlockII design concept.
Block I Connectors
The SCS equipment boxes for Block I were electrically interconnected
through small multipin connectors. The female half was attached to the
spacecraft and the male half was on the equipment enclosure. Mating dif-
ficulty was encountered because of the mass and length of the equipment
enclosure, and the high pin density of the connector. It was extremely dif-
ficult to mate the connector without breaking or bending pins. Other prob-
lems experienced included connector body breakage during insertion and
removal of the enclosure, connector damage during crimping and pin
removal, and retention spring breakage and pin burrs.
Because of the numerous problems experienced with the connectors,
an alternate source of procurement was considered. However, the part was
of an advanced design, and because of the considerable investment in the
original vendor, alternate source procurement was considered impractical.
The high breakage and failure rate of the connector led to an unexpected
usage of the available supply. This eventually resulted in prime contractor
schedule slippage as the supply ran out and acceleration of resupply was not
possible. The resupply problem was caused by a vendor who manufactured
the spring retention clip and who was unable to meet the resupply delivery
needs.
The connector problem for BlockIwas not solved by a design break-
through or the purchase of a different connector. Rather, there was con-
tinuous development until the end of the Block I program. The redesign and
repackaging of the SCS brought about by the Block II decision included a
change to standard connectors. No problems have been reported in this area
on the Block II system.
- 13 -
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Single-Point Failures
The search for, discovery, and elimination of single-point failures
has been a long and tedious job. The process of finding single-point failures
consists primarily of having designers continually search the wiring diagram
for trouble areas. Examples of single-point failures found and corrected to
date are"
I. SCS logic bus: a single short to ground would fail power to
all G&C mode and function switches.
TVC servo power switch: a failure in the single switch used
for both servo amps would fail TVC completely.
° Entry roll display: a single power bus failure would fail all
three methods of roll display.
. SCS drivers: a single SCS failure would cause the primary
mode to disable the reaction jet drivers.
° Rotation control for MTVC: a single power failure would leave
rotational control inoperative during N IT'vC operation.
The identification of single-point failures is difficult and time consum-
ing. A given subsystem generally consists of two modes, i.e., its nominal
mode and its backup or redundant mode. The normal and redundant modes
are generally similar, but the subsystem is at least twice as complex as it
would be if it did not need the redundant mode. A failure, of course, can
occur in either mode. Generally, the failure conditions and ensuing states
are known and understood by the designers. Special failure tests are con-
ducted to ensure that a single failure, and sometimes a multiple failure,
does not make a redundant system inoperative. Although this level of failure
analysis is tedious, it is generally successful.
The level of difficulty for single-point failure analysis increases sub-
stantially when several subsystems must be combined to form a total inte-
grated system. The permutations of the elements in the problem and the
types of failures increase considerably. Consideration must now be given
to power failure, switch [ailure, and prin_ary mode failures. Although these
total system effects should have been analyzed at the time of specification of
the subsystem so that each subsystem could be designed in terms of the
whole, this is seldom done because of time and schedule constraints as well
as a lack of detailed understanding of the total concept. The result is that
after the hardware has been committed for manufacture, many hours are
spent over drawings to see if what is being built will indeed have the
required redundancy.
- 14-
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The failure analysis at this point generally suffers from an eroding of
ground rules. Not uncommonly, the ground rules are changed so that the
failed states of the total system increase again. For example, it was an
original ground rule that switches would not short to ground. Experience
with the switches later in the program caused this ground rule to be deleted.
As a result, a whole new class of failure possibilities was introduced.
The complexity of modern space systems, together with the stress on
high reliability, puts a premium on fail-safe design and minimization of
single-point failures. Unfortunately, the present state of the design process
does not appear capable of handling these requirements. Thus, it is highly
desirable that some methodology be developed so that a system may be
analyzed for its possible failure modes quickly and thoroughly. Further, the
designers themselves should be made more fully conscious of failure modes
and the importance of system reliability.
Relay Failures
The Filtors, Inc. Golden-G relay was selected by the SCS subcon-
tractor for use in the Apollo SCS early in the Block I program. It was used
throughout Block I and subsequently throughout Block II. This choice was
based on several factors including performance capability, performance
history, size and weight, and the quality assurance and reliability procedures
and practices of the vendor. Few problems were initially encountered with
the Golden-G relays during the Block I program. Each problem or relay
failure (six in all) was analyzed or resolved on its individual merits and no
pattern of failure modes evolved. One of the six Block I relay failures was
caused by an internal solderball. Extensive research and testing was con-
ducted to assure that this was not a serious problem in the existing Block I
SCS. At that time a change from a soldered case-to-header-assembly to an
electron-beam weld was made-no further solderball problems occurred.
The welded-header Golden-G relay was then used exclusively in the
Block II SCS. There are 88 such double-pole, double-throw relays used in
this system. The subcontractor procured 4091 relays for the total Apollo
Program in two sel.arate two-week periods (four lots) during January and
July of 1966. Another 451 relays were retained by the vendor for Group B
and C lot acceptance test purposes. From this overall total (4542) there
were 27 failures. A limited number of Block II SCS relay malfunctions were
encountered during module testing prior to November 1966. The number and
type of malfunctions were not unusual or repetitive and their analysis and
establishment of appropriate corrective action were performed with normal
concern. However, in mid-November 1966, two relay failures occurred at
black-box level testing, including one in qualification test. This triggered
an extensive investigation by the subcontractor. The impact of those failures
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at this time was considered to be of major concern to the Apollo Program
since many of the electronic systems utilized these relays. Hence the
SCS subcontractors' investigation was monitored very closely by both the
contractor and NASA.
The two major distinctions relative to the failures were the types of
failures that occurred and the test level where they occurred. These
characteristics are summarized in Table i-i.
Table 1-1. Relay Failure
Failure Mode or Test Level
Failure Mode
I. Low normally open contact
pressure
2. Relay hangup
3. Low-insulation resistance
4. Miscellaneous
Totals
Test Level
i. Subas sembly
a. Relay part test
b. Module test
2. Device (pre-delivery)
a. Production check
b. Acceptance
3. Device (post-delive ry)
Number of Failures
Block I
2
0
3
6
Block II
6
2
5
8
21
2
14
a. Qualification
b. Field
c. Retrofit cycle
Totals
2 2
0 0
0 i
6 21
Total
7
4
5
ii
27
2
17
1
2
4
0
1
27
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The reliability considerations on the SCS may be summarized as
follows :
I. The relay failure rate objective established early in the Apollo
SCS Program was 0. l percent/1000 hours.
, Based on four relay hangup failures in 860, 000 device level
relay hours on the Block II SCS, the relay best-estimate
failure rate is 0.47 percent/1000 hours.
. The Block II SCS reliability requirements (as established in the
contractor procurement specification) is specified for each of
the individual devices. These device-level failure rates total
128. 7 percent/1000 hours.
. The most recent (May 1966) rigorous Block II failure-rate
predictions for the total SCS was 93. 31 percent/1000 hours.
This prediction assumed a relay failure rate of 0. 1 percent/
1000 hours.
. A relay failure of 0. 47 percent/i000 hours plus the addition of
two redundant relays in the thrust vector servo control device
increases the predicted Block II SCS failure rate to
126.81 percent/1000 hours, which is still within the
128.7 percent/1000-hour requirement.
Thus, added redundancy in the critical SCS relay circuits more than
offsets the ratio of apparent-to-desired relay failure rates. With a pre-
dicted relay failure rate of 0.47 percent/1000 hours, one relay failure in
every seven 14-day missions can be predicted; the probability of failure of
both redundant relays in a critical SCS circuit is practically zero and would
not significantly affect the mission reliability.
The relay investigation led to the following specific conclusions.
i. While the relay failure rate predictions based on current
experience have not met the original estimated failure rate
predictions, the SCS will meet the system reliability
requirements.
. Design of the SCS is such that no single relay failure will
prevent mission success.
o The relay represents the best proven state-of-the-art design
and is fully acceptable for use in the Apollo Program.
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.
Subcontractor in-house module and relay testing effectively
screens out low, normally open contact force relays and low
insulation resistance (wet) relays.
There appears to be no change in the test criteria at the device,
module, or relay level from the present process which will
reduce the probability of relay hangup.
. Although there are not better relays available today, the
isolated coil and contact design announced by the vendor should
be inherently better and, when proven, should be considered
for future manned space applications.
Changes
The Apollo contract was awarded in November of 1961 and the first
unmanned flight was made in February 1966. Thus far, four unmanned
flights and one manned flight have been attempted and each successfully
completed. Significant highlights of the program are shown in Figure 2-3.
The major redesign of the SCS occurred in June 1964 and affected the entire
vehicle as well as the SCS. The four initial unmanned flights utilized the
Block I design; the Apollo 7 manned flight used Block II. All remaining
flights will use the Block II design. Manual TVC, which was first thought
infeasible,
redesign.
because of
was incorporated into Block I at the same time as the Block I1
TVC redesigns of the Block II system occurred several times
changes in the vehicle body bending data.
The major change during the Apollo SCS program was the Block II
implementation. The original Apollo program concept was that all flight
vehicles would be the same as the ones that make the actual lunar-landing
trips. By the spring of 1964, there were enough changes made or planned
for the various systems that another block of vehicles was considered. In
the summer of 1964, the program was divided into Block I and Block II
vehicles. In general, only the Block II vehicles would have lunar-trip capa-
bility. The underlying concept of this change was that the PGNCS system
should be considered the prinaary mode of operation, and the SCS the backup
mode. That is, the SCS was to be used when the PGNCS is not used.
Besides the backup system designation, other changes made to the SCS at
that time were:
i. In-flight maintenance concept was deleted in favor of built-in
redundancy.
The electronics were repackaged with hermetic-type seals for
better humidity protection.
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4 Microminiature integrated circuits (IC) were used. Approximately
I5 percent of the electronics are IC's.
4, The mode switching concept was dropped in favor of functional
switching.
5. Electroluminescent lighting repIaced the integral lighting.
6. The rotation and translation hand controllers were redesigned.
7. Manual TVC was added.
, Six body-mounted attitude gyros (BMAG's) were used in place
of three BMAG's and three spring-restrained rate gyros.
9. A redundant FDAI was added.
There was an effort to remove the AGCU but this was decided to be
unwise. Rather, the AGCU was replaced by the GDC which has similar
functions but a higher rate capability. In addition to these changes, the
following studies took place:
I, Changing the SCS from a dc to an ac system (the ac system
proved to be less desirable).
Changing the SCS from an analog to a digital system. (This
was more complex and costly than retaining the analog system.)
The Block II system is currently in flight operations. Small changes
have been made to the system since the time of the original definition, but
these were primarily of a developmental nature and did not invalidate the
basic design.
CONC LUSIONS
The development experience and problems encountered during the
program to date result in these conclusions:
lo Incorporate built-in control signal redundancy and utilize
hermetically sealed enclosures in the initial design.
. Utilize standard electrical connectors or, if this is not possible,
resort to an alternate source of procurement for any advanced
designs.
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o Develop a failure analysis methodology to assist in the
identification of single-point failures.
The Block II design of built-in redundancy has proven to be as reliable
as the Block I system for less weight. Similarly, the use of standard con-
nectors on Block II has been less troublesome than the advanced design used
on Block I. The problem of single-point failures is one that will limit the
reliability of any system. The complexity of space systems lends itself to
a maze of failure modes and subtle circuits that make it almost impossible
to analyze by the present brute-force methods. Analysis tools and methods
are needed to assist in the total design process and ensure the operation of
the system.
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3.0 ATTITUDE REFERENCE SUBSYSTEM
This section discusses the SCS attitude reference subsystem (ARS).
This subsystem provides the backup attitude reference capability for control
maneuvers of the spacecraft. (The primary attitude reference is provided
by the primary guidance, navigation, and control system. ) The subsystem
consists of strapdown body-mounted attitude gyros (BMAG) that are used for
both attitude and rate sensing, together with an electronic assembly that
generates Euler angles from these quantities.
After a discussion of the operation and requirements for the backup
attitude reference subsystem, the tradeoffs among different mechanizations
considered for this subsystem are discussed. The mechanizations con-
sidered were both strapdown and inertiaI platform systems. The principal
probiem with this subsystem was drift rate, which was solved by improved
design and knowledge of this equipment. The major change for this
subsystem was the way in which the Euler angles were generated. In
Block I, the method was to use attitude change information, whereas in
Block II rate data is used.
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
This section describes the function and operation of the Block II attitude
reference subsystem. The purpose of the subsystem is to provide a backup
attitude reference capability for the Apollo spacecraft control functions. The
subsystem consists of two sets of three BMAG's, one set of which can be used
in the rate mode, and a coupler unit that generates Euler Angles.
Functions
As a backup attitude reference subsystem for spacecraft flight-control
operations, the functions performed by the subsystem are to provide:
. VehicIe attitude errors (in body coordinates) to the vehicle backup
control system during coast and thrusting phases
Vehicle attitude errors (in body coordinates) for dispiay on
attitude error needles
-23 -
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.
.
A set of Nuler angles, which describe the orientation of the vehicle
reference frame with respect to some inertial reference frame,
for display on a three-axis attitude ball
Total roll angle (about the command module stability axis) for dis-
play during entry
Resolution of stnall Euler angular errors (treated as vector
quantities) into body axes errors for display on attitude error
needles. These angular errors are the difference between a set
of Euler angles which describe a desired vehicle orientation
to a set which describes the actual vehicle orientation.
Mechanization
The attitude reference subsystem is comprised of three BMAG's and
an electromechanical Euler angle generator. The gyros are wide angle
(+20 degrees) miniature rate integrating gyros with a single degree of
freedom and the electronics necessary to allow them to be operated in either
a rate or attitude mode. The subsystem does not contain any nongyroscopic
sensors and therefore requires manual alignment using the scanning tele-
scope, contained within the guidance and navigation system, for inertial
alignment purposes.
The original reference subsystem mechanization stemmed from a
design tradeoff performed early in the program. The original subsystem
was envisioned to also include horizon and sun sensors for reference system
alignment, local vertical (gyrocompassing) operation, and solar orientation
during midcourse for spacecraft temperature control purposes. Early in
the program, the control and operational advantages afforded by these
nongyroscopic sensors were deemed inadequate to justify the additional com-
plexity created by their inclusion. As a result, these sensors were deleted
from the conceptual design of this subsystem.
Two different versions of the Euler angle generator (both analog) have
been designed and developed on the Apollo program. The present (Block I[)
version is referred to as the gyro display coupler (GDC), while the Block I
version is referred to as the attitude gyro coupler unit (AGCU). This con-
stituted a major design change.
The GDC accepts body rate information from the BMAG's operating in
a rate mode. This rate information is transformed into Euler rates and
subsequently integrated into Euler angles by electrical stepping motors.
These stepper motors then physically rotate shafts through Euler angles.
Attached to these shafts are electrical resolvers which are used to
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(1) transmit these shaft angles to the three-axes attitude ball or entry
monitor display, (2) provide the body-to-Euler rate transformation, and
(3) provide the Euler-to-body transformation required for the resoiution of
small Euler angular errors into suitable body axis errors for dispIay.
The accuracy of the sensors, when used in conjunction with the GDC
or AGCU, is highly dependent upon the magnitude and rate at which the
maneuver is performed, whether single or multi-axis maneuver, and time
between system alignment and maneuver initiation. The performance
specifications for this system are written accordingly and, because of the
many variables involved, the specifications are quite lengthy and are not
included as part of this report.
Design Features
The design of the Block I AGCU was unique in that the BMAG's were
operated in an attitude mode. Small body angles from the BMAG's are
resolved through a body rate to Euler rate transformation and, after
exceeding a specified threshold, are used to command fixed stepper motor
angular velocities (Euler rates). Simultaneously, equivalent fixed gyro
torquing commands (Euler rates) are issued, resolved through an Euler-to-
body rate conversion and applied to the BMAG torquing amplifier, thus
torquing the gyro back to null. As such, the AGCU was an integral part of
a feedback loop closed around the gyro where the resulting gyro torquing
commands were of a fixed magnitude but pulse-width modulated. The stepper
motors rotated shafts to which electrical resolvers were attached to pro,vide
the necessary signal transmission and coordinate conversion capabilities.
DESIGN RE QUIREMENTS
Requirements
The requirements for the attitude reference subsystem are as
follows:
Io The ARS must provide a reference (both inertial and local vertical)
from which large rotations of the vehicle can be measured and
displayed during all mission phases. In addition, the ARS must
provide small body axis angles for display on attitude error
needles.
2. The ARS must provide a frame of reference for the SCS autopilot
during both thrusting and coasting phases.
. The reliability allocation for the ARS was 0. 999276 for a mission
life of 150 hours.
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. The more general accuracy requirements for the total SCS, as
initially specified, are given in Table 3-i. From these numbers
the following ARS error allocations were budgeted:
Body axis error angles to
the error needles = +0.5 degrees/axis
Body axis error angles to
the autopilot -- +0.5 degrees/axis
Euler angles to the three-
axis attitude ball = +0. 5 degrees/axis
Design Requirement Tradeoffs
One of the requirements that the ARS must satisfy is the generation of
a set of data suitable for display which defines the orientation of one refer-
ence frame with respect to another. Euler angles are one means of satisfy-
ing this requirement. The gimbal angles of an inertially stabilized platform
physically measure these angles. A reference subsystem that measures
vehicle attitude with these angles necessarily has two directional singulari-
ties. Since the CSM has a requirement for omnidirectional pointing for delta
velocity (_V) maneuvers, and if the initial reference alignment is arbitrary,
then a provision must be made that allows the vehicle to be pointed in any
direction while still avoiding the singularity points. Two possible solutions
might be to (1) use direction cosines, or (Z) use a coordinate measuring
frame that is different from the vehicle body reference frame.
The primary control mode reference system, with its three-gimbal
platform, utilized the second of the above two solutions for avoiding
singularities. This was true for Block I; however, the Block II coordinate
measuring frame was aligned along vehicle axes. The problem was then
handled by a proper selection of platform alignment orientations prior to
pointing the vehicle.
Based on these considerations; and a desire for compatibility between
the primary and backup reference systems, a tradeoff was conducted between
reference subsystems which would provide Euler angles with the same
sequence and coordinate measuring frame as the primary system. This
selection provided the capability of displaying attitude information from
either the primary or backup ARS on a common display (three-axis attitude
ball).
A preliminary review of potential mechanizations that could provide
this and the other required functions eliminated all but the following candidate
systems.
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i. Strapdown attitude reference subsystems
a. Two 2-DOF {degrees of freedom) attitude gyros
b. Three single-D©F attitude gyros
2. Inertial reference platform subsystems
a. Three- gimbal platform
bo Four-gimbal platform (the fourth gimbal to be used only to
maintain a reference during uncontrolled vehicle tumbling)
A functional description of each of these subsystems is provided in
Figures 3-I, 3-2, and 3-3. All four mechanizations would be designed so
that all ARS requirements were met.
The results of the tradeoff study are summarized in Tables 3-2 and
3-3. The values tabulated, while inexact, were felt to be representative.
The numerical values assigned to cost, operation, and flexibility are used
to establish a relative position with regard to desirability.
Table 3-2 indicates the tradeoffs for the nonredundant subsystems,
while Table 3-3 considers the subsystems with sufficient redundancy
(inciuding spares) to satisfy the reliability allocation.
If a decision were to be made on the basis of the first table, and if
reliability were not a key item, then the four-gimbal platform would be an
obvious choice. However, since reliability must be satisfied, and since
none of the subsystems of Table 3-2 satisfy this requirement, then the
decision must be based upon the results of Table 3-3. From Table 3-3, if
size and weight are critical, the four-gimbal platform would be the first to
be eliminated, whereas, if operation and flexibiiity are essential, the two-
free gyro subsystem would be the first to be eliminated.
The volume aitd weight increases from Table 3-2 to Table 3-3 are a
direct result of subsystem redundancy requirements, e.g., it was
determined that since inertial platforms were not in-flight maintainable,
then two spare platforms would be required to satisfy the reliability require-
ment. The in-flight maintenance concept enhanced the weight and volume
figures for the strapdown subsystem. (Block I systems were designed to be
in-flight maintainable, whereas Block II systems are not.)
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Figure 3-1. Three Single-DOF Attitude Gyro ARS (Block I/AGCU)
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Figure 3-2. Two 2-DOF Attitude Gyro ARS
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The reliability calculations did not include the effects of equipment
being turned on and off; however, it was felt that the 150-hour mission life
would yield a reasonable number for reliability purposes.
The tradeoff parameters of operation and flexibility are discussed
below.
Operation
The tradeoff on operation separates the subsystems on the basis of the
freedom they allow in the design and operation of the spacecraft.
The four-gimbal platform is rated the highest in that it does not place
any practical limits on the vehicle attitude orientations or tumbling rates.
The three-gimbal platform, rated second, has two areas of attitude singulari-
ties, (gimbal lock regions) and while it also has no practical rate limitations,
arbitrary tumbling rates can carry the system into gimbal lock resulting in
a loss, or degraded performance, of the reference information. Either the
three or four-gimbal platforms inherently provide the highest degree of
accuracy, which permits longer periods between alignments.
The three single-DOF attitude gyro subsystem was rated third, above
the two-free gyro system, in that lower drift rates were available during
attitude hold periods and that only two areas of attitude singularities existed
as opposed to four areas with the two-free gyro subsystem. The major
disadvantages of this subsystem lie in the fact that (i) since the gyros must
be torqued at vehicle rates, the rate capability of the system is limited well
below the other systems considered, and (2) the subsystem accuracy (Euler
angle generation) is not only a function of the gyro drift errors but also of
the magnitude of the maneuver angle.
Flexibility
Flexibility, as used here, reflects the ability of a subsystem to meet
future operational changes and/or more demanding requirements as the
program progresses.
The gimballed subsystem again rates the highest with the four-gimbal
subsystem at the top. While this study did not consider the use of direction
cosines with the four-gimbal subsystem, the ability to do so does exist and
must be considered for future growth.
The accuracy and operational freedom of the two- and three-gyro-
subsystems were not expected to improve significantly with further develop-
ment; however, the low drift of the single-DOF gyro was adjusted to provide
the best basis for future change and was rated as third in flexibility.
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Tradeoff Study Conclusions
The following conclusions were drawn from this tradeoff study:
i° An inertially stabilized platform provides the best solution to the
attitude reference subsystem problem from a performance and
operational point of view - in particular the four-gimbal subsystem.
However, the reliability requirements are such as to result in an
unacceptable weight and volume penalty.
2. The three single-DOF-attitude gyro subsystem provides the best
compromise solution to the reference subsystem problem in terms
of all parameters considered. Its principal limitations are
(i) accuracy errors associated with gross vehicle maneuvers
(normal operation) and (2) inability to maintain an attitude refer-
ence under conditions of high and uncontrolled vehicle tumbling
rates (emergency operation). (The only subsystem considered
which could perform satisfactorily under the emergency conditions
was the four-gimbal subsystem.) In addition to this conclusion,
it was also recommended that a hardware design study be initiated
on an in-flight maintainable, four-gimbal platform which, if
feasible, could be phased into the program at a later date.
° The two-free gyro subsystem was considered the most complex
system studied. This, in addition to the operational limitations
(four areas of attitude singularities) and high drift rates, caused
this system to be rated below the three-gyro subsystem.
A decision was subsequently made to utilize the three-gyro subsystem
concept as the Apollo backup attitude reference subsystem. This decision
resulted in a qualification to the original accuracy requirement of ±0. 5 degree
axis in the generation of E_ller angles. (The magnitude of the maneuver also
had to be considered. )
During the study it was felt that a maneuver accuracy equal to 1 per-
cent of the maneuver angle would be attainable. This error resulted from
resolver errors, gyro torquers, and torquer amplifier repeatability and
power supply regulation. The performance requirement for this subsystem
was then changed to be commensurate, assuming that if the required
maneuver was greater than 50 degrees, the subsystem would be realigned
at the new orientation and prior to execution of the required control system
function.
Also during the study it was assumed that the total effective gyro drift
error would be compensated in the system to one degree per hour or better.
This assumption later led to a proposal for in-flight drift trim of the gyros.
3Z-
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PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problem
Perhaps the most significant system design problem encountered in
the development of the backup ARS was the reference drift problem, particu-
larly during rotational maneuvers. The gyros and torquing amplifiers had
higher drift characteristics than expected, 7 degrees/hr and 30 degrees/hr,
respectively. Since the performance capability was based upon a 1 degree/
hr drift rate, in-flight gyro trimming was proposed.
This, however, imposed a heavy and unacceptable reliance on the
primary system if the trimming were to be accomplished automatically,
e.g., using the guidance and navigation sextant and digital computer. A
ground rule was then imposed which required that in-flight trim could utilize
only the PGNCS scanning telescope which was normally required for align-
ment purposes.
Methods for performing the in-flight trim (compatible with the above
ground rule) were then studied. The results of these studies indicated that
not only did in-flight trim impose time consuming tasks upon the astronaut,
it was also ineffective. In fact, if the trim were performed on an individual
axis basis, then the time required to trim one axis would invalidate the
results of the previous axis trim because of the limited stability of the
torquing amplifiers.
Following this conclusion, a review of the drift problem was undertaken
to determine if the requirement for in-flight trim could be deleted. A mech-
anization was arrived at that provided the final resolution to this problem,
and which resulted in the foilowing changes:
. All requirements for in-flight trimwere deleted; however, a
requirement was established to trim the gyros at Cape Kennedy
prior to launch. (This requirement was recently deleted based
upon test data gathered on the Block I program. )
An additional switch was placed between the torquing amplifier
and the gyro torquer so that the torquing amplifier was connected
to the torquer only during the actual maneuver.
.
Time constraints were established on the time allocated to perform
a maneuver and the time interval between the alignment and the
initiation of the maneuver.
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, The torquing amplifier maximum range was reduced in pitch and
yaw. (This range was again increased and, in fact, became even
larger for the Block II system.) Certain other specification
changes were imposed on system components.
. The error budget for the ARS was increased to allow for larger
reference system errors.
Changes
A major design change to the AI%S was initiated following the Block II
definition study performed by NASA MSC. This study concluded that a
number of operational and functional changes should be made to the combined
PGNCS/SCS system. Specific changes to this equipment were also enumer-
ated. In terms of the ARS, perhaps the most significant equipment change
requirements were deletion of the AGCU, addition of a simple set of single-
axis attitude displays which could be driven by either integrated rate outputs
from the "caged" BMAG's or inertial measurement unit (IMU) gimbal angles,
and deletion of in-flight maintenance.
An additional desired equipment change related to the AKS was the
replacement of the three Block I spring-restrained rate gyros by an addi-
tional set of three BMAG_s.
These changes were then studied in more detail by representatives of
NASA, MIT, and NR. A sumnaary of these decisions, related to the ARS,
is given below:
i . A backup ARS with an all-attitude capability would be maintained
in the Block II system, i.e., three-axis attitude ball display
rather than the three single-axis attitude displays. This require-
ment was based upon a strong astronaut preference for this type
of display.
Tile design problems associated with using the Apollo guidance
computer in conjunction with the BMAG's for generating the Euler
angle set, and driving the ball display, were of such a nature as
to discourage this method as a possible solution.
. An analog Euler angle generator (GDC) mechanization was selected
over a digital version for the Block II backup ARS based upon cost
and schedule considerations. A functional description of this sys-
tem is given in Figure 3-4.
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Figure 3-4. Three Single-DOF Attitude Gyro ARS (Block II/GDC)
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. The six-BMAG configuration was selected for Block II in prefer-
ence to the Block I configuration of three BMAG's and three
spring-restrained rate gyros. All six of these BMAG's had the
capability of being operated in the rate mode and providing rate
data of sufficient accuracy to be used in the generation of the Euler
angle information by the GDC.
The areas in which there were ARS requirement changes are indicated
in Table 3-4. The tradeoffs between the various systems studied are tabu-
lated in Table 3-5. The systems identified in Table 3-5 are described below:
System A - This is an all-analog system which integrates body rates
and displays this information on three separate attitude-display needles
The system does not meet the all-attitude capability required of the
backup ARS.
System B (GDC) - This is an all-analog system which generates Euler
angles for display on a three-axis ball. The electronic feedback loops
around the BMAG's are of the Block I type (BMAG's in rate mode)
except with greater torquing capability. This is the system selected
for Block If.
System C - This system is the same as System B except that the Euler
angle generator is mechanized digitally.
System D - This system is an all-digital version of system B, includ-
ing pulse rebalance loops around the gyros.
Table 3-4. ARS Requirements Changes
Requirement Block I Block II
Rate sensor requirements ±30 °/sec ±50 °/sec
Entry and manual TVC rate
requirements:
Roll
Pitch and yaw
Entry roll attitude display
accuracy
±Z5°/sec
±5°/sec
No requirenaents
±50°/sec
±50°/sec
±5 °
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System E - This system is the same as C except that the Euler angle
generator capability is contained within the guidance computer.
System F - This system is the same as D except the Euler angle
generator capability is contained within the guidance computer.
In the evolution of the ARS, certain other design changes were made,
motivated by a desire to simplify the system.
The first of these was the deletion of the horizon and sun sensors from
the backup ARS. This, however, occurred early in the program and did not
result in changes to actual hardware. With the deletion of the horizon sen-
sor gyrocompass local vertical mode, a fixed gyro torquing signal (orbit
rate) was used to provide a pseudo or open-loop local-vertical mode. This
signal was resolved into torquing currents to the appropriate gyros, depend-
ing upon the vehicle orientation with respect to the local vertical. The
requirement for this mode of operation was later felt to be unjustifiable and
the mechanization required to provide this capability was deleted from the
system. In 1967, this function was again added at the request of the
astronauts. The NASA provided as GFE the orbital rate drive electronics
for Apollo and the lunar module (ORDEAL).
The secant function mechanization contained in the transformation
from body to Euler rates was deleted from the AGCU mechanization.
Because of the manner in which these angles were generated in the Block I
system, the deletion of these functions in effect changed the feedback gain
around the gyros. The net effect was that of varying the threshold levels
for torquing the Euler stepper motors. For reasonable inner-gimbal angles,
the error contribution due to this change in threshold level was found to be
acceptable.
CONC LUSIONS
Since the operation and performance of this subsystem has been
satisfactory during the spacacraft flights and developmental problems do
not suggest any cha_Iges, there are no hindsight suggestions.
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4. 0 THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
This section discusses the thrust vector control (TVC) subsystem of
the SCS. The TVC subsystem provides flight control of the Apollo spacecraft
during thrusting of the service module service propulsion system (SPS).
The present TVC provides for both automatic and manual control with the
lunar module on (LM ON) and the lunar module off (LM OFF).
The function and operation of the present subsystem, the requirements
and ground rules used in establishing the subsystem design, and the prob-
lems associated with the development of this subsystem are presented.
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Functions
The Apollo spacecraft has two modes of service propulsion flight
control--the primary and the backup mode. The primary mode uses the
guidance and navigation digital computer to generate control commands
whereas the backup mode uses the analog electronics of the SCS. As a
backup system, the function performed by the TVC is to provide pointing
and stabilization during thrusting maneuvers. These thrusting maneuvers
include midcourse delta V's, lunar orbit insertion, transearth injection,
earth orbit retro, and high-altitude abort.
The second function of the TVC subsystem is to provide both primary
and backup control for the engine position system.
Mechanization
The TVC subsystem consists of analog electronics to generate engine
gimba[ commands and analog electronics to control the positioning of the
service module main engine. A functional diagram is shown in Figure 4-i.
The engine servo system accepts commands from the following modes of
ope ration:
i, Primary mode commands from the guidance and navigation
compute r
2. Backup automatic (SCS) mode commands
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, Rotation hand controller commands with rate damping and
compensation.
4. Rotation hand controller commands directly.
The backup automatic autopilot consists of vehicle attitude and attitude rate
feedback and the integral of the sum of gimbal position and vehicle attitude
error. These sensor outputs pass through compensation networks; the
exact form depending on the vehicle configuration, the output of which forms
the engine command. The manual mode of control consists of (i) using the
rotation controller output either directly into the gimbal servo system or
combining it with the vehicle rate information, and (2) passing it through
some compensation and then £o the gimbal servo. The rate feedback mode
is not used with the lunar module attached.
The major subsystem in the TVC subsystem is the SPS gimbal servo
system, which consists of three basic elements--the actuator, the gimba[
assembly, and the servo electronics. The actuator is controlled by pitch
and yaw loop servo systems employing the sensing of actuator extension or
retraction rate and position. Engine angular position, with respect to the
spacecraft, may be commanded by electrical input to the servo amplifier.
The actuator consists of a dc motor geared to a magnetic-particle
clutch, the output of which is geared to a recirculating ball lead screw,
which converts the rotary clutch motion to linear actuator travel. A velocity
transducer supplies an ac signal proportional to clutch output angular
velocity, and a position transducer supplies an ac signal proportional to
the linear displacement between the actuator frame and output shaft. These
signals go to the servo amplifier, and to the gimbal position indicator on the
pilot's display panel.
The engine angular travel is limited, by spring snubbers within the
actuator, to ±4.5 degrees in yaw and ±4.5 degrees in pitch. The yaw actuator
electrical null, which is at the mechanical center, is 0 degrees in yaw and
I-I/2 degrees in pitch from the spacecraft centerline; distortion of the thrust
structure during the firing of the engine brings these values to l degree in
yaw and 2 degrees in pitch. This unsymmetrical gimbal travel is dictated
by variations in the lateral position of the vehicle center of gravity as
propellant is consumed.
The main element of the gimbal assembly is the circular gimbal ring
containing the four gimbal bearings set along two orthogonal coplanar axes.
The engine mounts are attached to the inner-race of the yaw bearing, and
the mounts, in turn, are mounted to the spacecraft. Two "thrust struts" tie
the pitch inner-races to the engine injector head. The engine itself fits
through the gimbal ring so that the plane of the ring intersects the engine
near the throat of the combustion chamber.
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The yaw actuator rod-end fittings, which swivel, are mounted at the
gimbal ring about half-way between the pitch and yaw bearings and to the
spacecraft structure at the inner edge of the No. l web. The pitch actuator
drives between the injector head and the gimbal ring, about half-way between
the pitch and yaw bearings. The actuator lever arm used for rotating the
engine on its bearings is approximately I foot long. The engine and gimbal
mounts are shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-3.
Design Features
Three design features of the TVC system are as follows:
I. Electromagnetic particle clutch actuator
2. SCS integrator
3. Manual TVC mode
An electromagnetic particle clutch actuator is used to apply positioning
forces on the main engine rather than the traditional hydraulic actuator. The
use of this actuator for Apollo was the first time that a magnetic particle
clutch had been used for a large thrust engine in a space environment.
The service module propellant system consists of two sets of oxidizer
and fuel tanks. The engine is fed in a serial fashion rather than in a parallel
manner, which results in large excursions of the spacecraft's center of
gravity during the course of the mission. The nozzle and attitude position
information are summed and then integrated to form a bias signal for the
engine gimbal servo. In this manner, the center-of-gravity motion is
tracked by the engine.
The high angular accelerations possible with the SPS (Zl, 000 pounds
thrust) was first thought to be too large to allow manual control of the
vehicle attitude during thrusting. Simulation studies midway through the
program indicated rate damped attitude control of light vehicles and direct
attitude control of heavy vehicles were definitely feasible. Manual TVC offers
the astronaut a simple control system capable of satisfying crew survival
requirements and is essentially redundant to the other modes of thrusting.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
This section describes the design requirements and ground rules used
for the Apollo TVC subsystem. The requirements consist of those supplied
by the customer and those internally generated. The ground rules are those
used to establish the internal requirements. A substantial amountof the
requirements relate to body-bending parameters and reflect the difficulty
the program has had in developing good data.
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Figure 4-2. SPS Engine Mount
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Figure 4-3. SPS Gimbal Mount
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Requirements
Customer Requirements
The basic design requirements for the backup TVC subsystem are as
follows:
1.
Z.
Maintenance of linear and nonlinear stability
Satisfy pointing accuracy of:
a. Translunar midcourse corrections: 5.7 degrees (30-)
b. Transearth injection: 1. 54 degrees (30-)
c. Transearth midcourse: 5.7 degrees (30-)
The following internally generated requirements and ground rules
generally apply to satisfaction of stability requirements.
Internal Requirements
In an attempt to further define the basic requirements, a set of internal
design requirements were generated. The ground rules used in the establish-
ment of these requirements are given in the next section.
Angular Control. Pointing error (_@) is defined as the angle between
the desired AV vector and that achieved at the termination of thrusting, as
illustrated below:
/xV_ ERROR
AV DESIRED
Note that the magnitude of the delta V achieved vector is independent of the
pointing error as defined here.
These requirements apply to each autopilot channel (pitch and yaw)
independently and will be met in the presence of the expected error sources.
Values for pointing error requirements include all control system effects
(SCS, vehicle dynamics, etc.) from initiation of the ullage maneuver to the
end of thrust tailoff.
These requirements do not apply to other errors incurred in perform-
ing an SCS AV burn, such as those involved in aligning the spacecraft to the
thrusting attitude; only the TVC portion of the total AV budget is tabulated
above.
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Magnitude Control. Control of the magnitude of the delta V, when the
burn is accomplished in the backup mode, will be within 1.3 percent or
0.7 fps (three sigma) for all maneuvers, exclusive of propulsion uncer-
tainti e s.
Stability Requirements. The TVC system will have a minimum of
30 degrees phase margin and 6. 0 db gain margin over the linear (non-
saturation) range of operation.
These margin requirements must be met in the presence of one sigma
tolerance conditions with respect to system parameters which affect stability.
The system must not show instability for a three-sigma tolerance buildup.
SM Abort. Vehicle pitch and yaw angular rates will converge to an
angular rate of 2.0 deg/sec or less within I0 seconds for the initial condi-
tions specified. In addition, vehicle motion will converge from any com-
bination of initial conditions.
Vehicle Attitude. Hunting or limit cycling of vehicle attitude because
of autopilot dynamics will not be of such magnitude as to interfere with
system accuracy or to cause any display activity that would introduce an
uncertainty in monitoring or failure detection with regard to proper system
operation. This criterion would be met if vehicle attitude did not exceed
one-fourth of a degree (peak-peak) at any frequency below l cps, and
0 degree above l cps.
Engine Angular Position. The SPS engine positioning servo subsystem
should not produce a position limit cycle amplitude in excess of one-tenth
of a degree (p-p) at any frequency below 2 cps. Limit cycling of any ampli-
tude at a frequency above 2 cps is unacceptable.
Ground Rules
The ground rules used to establish these internal requirements are
listed as follows:
1. System stability as shown in Table 4-1.
2. Phase stabilization of bending modes 18 rad/sec or less.
3. Maximum gain consistent with system stability.
4. Roll-off filter natural frequency as low as possible.
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°
,
.
Bending data tolerances:
Frequencies
LM ON ±20%
LM OFF ±25%
Mode Shapes
±50%
±25%
Bending data will always be used at the extremes of ranges
yielding the least stability.
Time-critical performance requirements exist during transearth
injection which require failure takeover without shutdown of the SPS.
, Circumlunar-free return abort mission is always carried out
with the LM ON.
. SM abort from booster failures to be in automatic modes, not
MTVC.
10. MTVC will be used as the takeover mode for all CSM guidance and
control {G&C) failures that occur during power flight.
ii. There is no requirement for LM ON delta V's initiated in the
MTVC mode, but MTVC is required for takeover of failures
during LM ON delta V maneuvers initiated in the automatic modes.
1Z. Lunar orbit injection(LOI) is done only in the primary mode. Failures
in the primary mode prior to LOI warrant aborting LOI.
13. Failures during LOI require MTVC takeover to damp transients
and shutdown of SPS.
14. MTVC requirements with the LM OFF are for the rate-damped
mode only.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
This section discusses the evolution, problems, and changes that
affected the TVC subsystem. The problems discussed are development
of the electromagnetic clutch actuator, body bending data variations, and
series propellant feed system.
Problems
Magnetic Particle Clutch Development
The electromechanical actuator was a problem primarily caused by the
difficulties encountered in the development of the electromagnetic clutch.
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The principal problems with the clutch were overheating and nonlinear
characteristics. The nonlinear effects, although affecting vehicle limit
cycle and making one actuator appear slightly different from another, did
not substantially interfere with the system operation. The primary cause of
clutch overheating is thrust misalignment during the SPS burns. The over-
heating caused the gain of the clutch to decrease, not only for that burn
but for subsequent burns as well. This gain decrease could be as great as
50 percent. On the other hand, a new actuator couId have a clutch gain of
greater than 50 percent of nominal. As a result, the control system design
had to allow for clutch gain variations of ±50 percent.
There were three design changes to the actuator in an attempt primarily
to prevent the clutch from overheating. This was done by changing the gear-
ing of the motor to the clutches. The slip speed between the rotating input
and stationary output members of the clutches is then less and the subsequent
heat generation is less. The penalty for the design change is that, for a
given motor speed, the engine moves slower.
A lower actuator rate resulted in a loss of some large initial condition
or nonlinear stability capability. The mission requirements were then
changed to prevent a failure or starting transient that would be outside the
capability of the system to recover. The nonlinear stability problem was
experienced in the Block I system. The Block II system has a lower loop
gain than Block I and has smaller limits on engine excursion and thus is less
susceptible to the actuator low rate changes.
The autopilot has not been changed because of these development
problems; however, during required SCS changes for the variation in body
bending data the latest estimate of the actuator performance was factored
into the new design. Thus far, there have been no flight failures or problems.
Body Bending Data Variation.
The variation in body bending data has been a major problem. Table
4-2 lists the various sets of bending data available. The original design was
based upon the first set of data. In April 1965, the NASA deleted modal
testing for the CSM and CSM plus LM. As a result, the autopilot was changed
in September 1965 to make it less sensitive to body bending. At that time
tolerances of +15 percent for the bending frequency and 510 percent for the
mode shape were assumed. The body bending set No. II is a reanalysis
of set I and did not affect the design.
In the spring of 1965, the Boeing Aircraft Corr_pany performed a modal
analysis that separated the structure into its component parts rather than
assuming that the structure was a beam. These data (set No. III) indicate
a first-mode frequency 50 percent less than the 1963 data. This variation
is considerably outside the 15 percent tolerance; however, the data were
considered preliminary.
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In January 1966 on Spacecraft 009 (the first Block I flight spacecraft),
a TVC system instability occurred during checkout on the stack at KSC.
Evaluation of the data indicated that the cause was probably a body-bending
resonance at approximately 17 cps. The bending analysis at that time had
indicated that the free-free mode would be in excess of 30 cps. Although the
test was performed on the S-IB stack, it was felt that 17 cps could be indica-
tive of a free-free mode at the CM/SM interface. The Block I TVC system
was modified and the instability cured. Considerable doubt, however, was
introduced in the analytically generated bending data. The first two Block I
vehicles did not exhibit any in-flight TVC instability, although components of
signal at about 17 cps have been evident in the rate-gyro traces of every
Block I flight. Shortly thereafter, the modal analysis task was reassigned to
Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge (TRW).
In the late summer of 1966, NR produced another set of bending data
(set No. IV). The LM ON analysis indicated a first-mode frequency of
7 rad/sec, which was in agreement with the Boeing data. At that time, it
was indicated that the Block II SCS was unstable when certain of the unofficial
sets of bending data were used and that if modifications were required, they
would have to be made soon if existing hardware schedules were to be met.
Shortly thereafter, a decision was made in conjunction with the customer
to redesign the SCS to provide adequate stability n?argins for all existing sets
of bending data. The performance requirenlents \vere changed to their pre-
sent value at that time. This relaxation was required because system per-
formance was degraded when the system gains were reduced to the extent
necessary to provide adequate stability for the range of bending data used.
The SCS electronics fabricated were designed to accomn)odate dominate
modal frequencies in the range of 1.0 to 1.6 cps.
Revised Grumman Aircraft Company stiffness data for the lunar module
were forwarded to NR tron_ NASA/MSC (Grumn_an data revised December 1966)
and frequencies were determined using these revised data for the CSM+LM
half-full condition in April 1967. The first three frequencies were 2. 15, 2. 60,
and Z.90 cps. Also at this time, TRW data <_ere available for the CSM+LM
quarter-full propellant loading condition. The first two bending modes were
2. 1 and 2.4 cps. In the summer of 1968, it was decided to modify several
spare electronic boxes to a design based upon bending in the 1.75 to Z. 86 cps
range. Modal testing at the end of the summer of 1968 indicated bending
frequencies of 2.76, 3.01, and 3.87 cps. It was thus decided to n_ake the
new design common to all spacecraft subsequent to 103. Thus three separate
autopilot configurations were fabricated as flight articles before the first
LM- ON flight.
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Series Propellant Feed System
The service module propellant storage consists of four tanks, two each
for oxidizer and fuel. The propellant is fed to the engine in a serial fashion
rather than all four tanks at once. Thus, the center of gravity of the space-
craft not only moves longitudinally but laterally as well during propellant
consumption. This lateral motion of the center of gravity means the engine
must move about two degrees in Block II (nearly four degrees in Block I) to
keep pointing through the center of gravity. To provide a bias signal to the
engine for tracking the center of gravity, the autopilot generates the integral
of the nozzle position and vehicle attitude with a stage called the SCS integra-
tor. The addition of this loop requires a slightly lower autopilot gain than
would be the case without it. Reduced travel of the engine would, furthermore,
cause less effect on the vehicle during engine hardover failure. That is,
engine deflection limiting has a stabilizing effect on the vehicle control system,
and smaller engine deflections produce smaller lateral loads and moments
on the space spacecraft structure.
An attempt was made to change to a parallel feed system but the
spacecraft design was too far along to warrant the change.
Tradeoff
A tradeoff that affected the TVC was the hydraulic actuator versus
the electromagnetic particle clutch actuator. The problems associated with
the electromagnetic particle clutch actuator make the tradeoff between it
and the hydraulic actuator relevant for future system considerations. These
problems consisted primarily of clutch gain variations of ±50 percent. The
tradeoff results, which are summarized in the following paragraphs, repre-
sent results of a study performed just after the program started, and certain
results would perhaps be modified if the tradeoff were performed today.
Power Requirements. The power requirements of the electrohydraulic
system are considerably higher than the electromechanica[ system because
of its inefficient low-power capability. During the normal operating condi-
tion, which consists of more than 80 percent of the thrust vector control
operating time, the power requirements of the electrohydraulic system are
about i00 percent higher than that of the electromechanical system. As a
result, total power requirements for the e[ectrohydrau[ic system are about
75 percent higher for the duration of the 500-second TVC operating time.
Space Compatibility. The eIectromechanical system is more compat-
ible with the space environment because of the absence of a working fluid
which has to be contained in a reservoir under pressure. Furthermore, a
hydraulic system would have to be provided with a temperature control which
would have to maintain the working fluid between -65 and +300 1p.
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Reliability. The study indicated a slight reliability superiority of
the hydraulic systems over the electromechanica[ system. Capability of
reliability growth lies with the electromechanical system because of the
smaller number of subassemblies in the system and its better space
compatibility.
Growth Potential. The growth potential of the electromechanical
system is higher in view of the possibility of extending the duration of
missions and the severity of the environment without major changes. The
growth potential of a hydraulic system is less favorable, since temperature
control would have to be provided to cover a more severe temperature
environment than is presently specified.
Changes
The basic configuration of the TVC has not changed since its initial
design. The Block I system was initially required to have LM ON capability
and was the primary method of vehicle stabilization during thrusting. The
guidance or steering of the vehicle was accomplished by guidance and
navigation computer commands. At the time of the Block II redesign, the
Block I system was changed to LM OFF capability only and MTVC was
added. The Block II system was made solely a backup mode to the
primary control with a system for LM ON and LM OFF. The manual TVC
function was made a part of the systelrl as welh Because of the body bending
data problems, the Block II system gains and con_pensation were changed
three times and the Block I system once.
CONCLUSIONS
The major development problem encountered with the TVC subsystem
was the continual variation in body bending data. These data, until late in
the summer of 1968, were all analytically derived. Clearly a more accurate
analysis method needs to be developed. At the same time, more effort is
warranted in the developFnent of a less sensitive, yet hiKh-performing TVC
subsystem.
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5. 0 ATTITUDE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
This section discusses the SCS attitude control subsystem (ACS). This
subsystem provides the backup attitude flight control capability for the space-
craft during all mission phases except entry and thrusting of the service
propulsion system engine. The subsystem may be operated in either the
automatic mode or the manual mode. Propulsive force is provided by 16
hypergolic on-off engines, and low-limit cycle rates are maintained by
pseudo rate feedback.
Low-limit cycle rates for navigation sighting requirements have been
the most difficult requirement to satisfy. The problem has been that of obtaining
small thrust pulses from the thrusters without damaging the engine. Another
problem was the maintenance of thermal control of the spacecraft through
continuous rotation with a minimum of fuel.
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The ACS is contained within the stabilization and control system. It
is composed of the electronics necessary to accept command signals from
the rotation and translation hand controls, rate and attitude error signals
from the attitude reference subsystem, and configuration switching signals
from the main control panel. The ACS causes the service module reaction
jets to fire in such a manner as to control vehicle motion.
Functions
The ACS provides the following general functions as a backup in case
of failure of the primary control system or in those instances when it is
desired to shut down the primary system:
i. Hold spacecraft attitude within a selectabte deadband using error
signals from the ARS.
_o Provide for manual control of spacecraft attitude in the following
configurations:
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a. Proportional rate commands
bo On-off acceleration commands to the RCS solenoid automatic
coils
Co Minimum impulse commands from the rotation hand control
(R/C) to the RCS solenoid automatic coils
d, On-off acceleration commands from the R/C direct switches
to the RCS solenoid direct coils
o Provide for manual translation c_mmands in six directions from
the translation hand control (T/C)
4. Provide for automatic rate stabilization of the vehicle
, Provide for manual ullage commands to either the automatic or
direct RCS solenoid coils
o Provide override logic for compatibility between automatic and
manual operation (astronaut direct commands take precedence
and cause appropriate automatic functions to be inhibited)
Mechanization
A simplified single-axis functional block diagram of the ACS is given
in Figure 5-i. Figure 5-Z depicts the ACS thruster arrangement. With
reference to Figure 5-1, the operation of the ACS may be described
as follows:
A rate error signal is formed as the difference between the proportional
rate command from the R /C and the rate gyro signal from the ARS. The
attitude error signal from the ARS is processed through a selected minimum
or maximum deadband and summed with the rate error signal to form the
total error to the switching amplifier. When the magnitude of this error
signal exceeds a fixed threshold, the switching amp output is turned on (the
operation of the pseudo rate lag is described later in this section). The out-
put of the switching amp, after proper routing by the driver selection matrix
and amplification by the RCS driver amplifiers, is used to actuate the auto-
matic coils of the RCS solenoids in an on-off fashion. The output of the
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switching amp is also used to trigger a one-shot whose output is used in a
logical "or" function to limit the minimum duration of RCS commands.
This one shot may also be triggered by Z8-volt signals from the breakout
switches of the R/C when minimum impulse commands are required. The
driver amplifiers may also be enabled to accept these breakout signals as
direct on-off acceleration commands from the astronaut. Translation
commands from the T/C are also simultaneously processed by the driver
selection matrix and used to command the appropriate RCS jets. (No
priority is given to either rotation or translation commands and the simul-
taneous occurrence of these commands can cause opposing RCS engines to
fire. }
All the above commands cause actuation of the RCS solenoid automatic
coils. There is another coil co-wound on each solenoid designated the"direct
coil. " This coil is actuated by direct 28-volt commands from either the
direct switches of the R/C or by the direct ullage panel switch. (Commands
to the direct coils are given priority and cause the automatic coil commands
to be inhibited.)
Design Features
There are two features of the ACSwhich have received considerable
attention during the design of the system and are therefore considered
interesting enough to be pointed out separately here. The first is the nature
of the reaction jets themselves. These engines are hypergolic on-off (non-
throttleable) engines which use hydrazine as a fuel arid nitrogen tetroxide as
an oxidizer arid attain approximately 100 pounds of steady-state thrust.
Sixteen of these engines are mounted on the service module in groups of
four (quads) to provide rotational torques in roll, pitch, and yaw, and trans-
lational acceleration along the x, y, and z spacecraft axes. Each engine has
associated with it two solenoid valves - one for fuel and one for oxidizer -
which operate together to provide thrust. The problem of obtaining very
low vehicle rates by firing these engines for short durations, while at the
same time avoiding a mismatch of fuel-to-oxidizer mixture ratio which might
result in combustion instability and destructive detonation of the engines, has
been a difficult and continuing problem. It is by far the biggest technical
problem encountered in the design of the ACS and one that has not been com-
pletely solved to this day.
A second interesting feature of the ACS is the use of a "pseudo rate"
feedback to modulate the pulsing of the RCS engines. Although often misunder-
stood by persons not initimately familiar with the functional design and
performance analysis of the ACS, it has received a great deal of attention
in the design and analysis of the system and its operation has weighed
heavily in many tradeoff studies. The operation of the pseudo rate feedback is
basically, as its name implies, to derive some sort of rate information for
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use when the conventional rate information is not available or suitable. This
may be the case when the rate gyros are intentionally shut down to conserve
power or increase reliability (a feature made possible by pseudo rate) or for
operation below the threshold of the rate gyros. Conventional rate informa-
tion is not suitable during the transport lag of the reaction jets or the ACS
rate loop lag. In order to provide n_inimum impulses, pseudo rate is used
to shut off the switching amplifier command to the reaction jets before any
detectable thrust has been produced.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
This section describes the constraints, requirements, and ground
rules used to define the performance of the present Block II ACS. In most
cases the present requirements differ considerably from the original require-
ments and many have evolved with system design. Some of the requirements
and constraints are still being changed.
Requirements
The following data summarize the ACS parameters and their defining
requirements.
Parameter Value Requirement Remarks
0. Z ° 0. 2 °Minimum atti-
tude deadband
Maximum atti-
tude deadband
Rate deadband
Rate to attitude
gain
Automatic limit
cycle rate
Manual mini-
mum impul se
rate
i
4. 2°
0.2°/sec
I°/sec
0.05°/sec
0. 05°/sec
4. 2 °
0. 2°/sec
l°/sec
O. l°/sec
0.04°/sec
0. 5° accuracy required
for AV orientation
Roll control during AV
and attitude hold.
Propellant minimization
Propellant minimization
Mechanization allows
same auton_atic rate as
manual rate
Specification change
notice in process to
alleviate the requirement
In addition to these requirements, the minimum value of the electrical
pulse width to the RCS engines is constrained by a _'safe operation" value.
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This requires an electrical pulse to the RCS engines to be greater than the
pulse width (PW) defined by
where
PW
1
pw = 25.5-_v
= pulse width in milliseconds
V = valve supply volts
Tradeoffs
The ACS was initially conceived as the primary control system for
nonthrusting and nonatmospheric entry phases of the Apollo mission
(i.e., all free-fall phases including earth orbit, translunar midcourse,
lunar orbit, and transearth midcourse). The purpose of the AGSwas to
allow the astronaut to maneuver the vehicle about all.three axes, to hold
attitude about a given reference, and to stabilize the vehicle to low angular
rates. In addition, the ACS was to provide roll-attitude control during
thrusting maneuvers.
The initial design tradeoff studies were primarily concerned with
system configuration and were performed before specific mission require-
ments were defined. The configurations considered were chosen to allow
flexibility for change of parameter values as mission requirements become
firm.
A ground rule for all initial decisions was to use only state-of-the-art
devices where possible. For this reason on-off (nonthrottleable) reaction
jets were chosen as control devices and the ACS was necessarily configured
as an on-off control system. The primary tradeoff consideration was there-
fore given to the method of modulating the on-off control of the reaction jets.
For the purposes of these tradeoffs, certain assumptions were made regard-
ing other elements of the SCS system, namely:
. Rate and attitude sensors will be provided for other functions
(such as thrust vector control} and these sensors will be avail-
able for use by the ACS.
Z. It may be desirable to shut off the rate sensors to conserve power.
o The attitude sensor will provide a signal that is usable for deriving
rate information.
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. The smallest rate chan_e required will be greater than that pro-
duced by the _aainimum imp,llse bit of the reaction jets.
. Translation commands will be man,_ally commanded on-off signals
which require no signal processing other than jet selection.
, The primary function of the ACS is to provide low residual rates
and good fuel economy during attit_ide hold limit cycle and
rna ne uve r s.
The most difficult requirement to meet was that of achieving low-limit
cycle rates. The actulal requirement for navigation si_htin_s was not
known, but it was assun_ed that obtaining a sin_zle n_inimunq impulse limit
cycle was required. The simplest possible systen_, the normal on-off
limit switching system, is not capable of producin_ a minimum in,pulse
limit cycle; the final limit cycle rate of such a system is a function of the
following parameters:
I. Reaction jet i_inimurn impulse rate chan_ze
2. Rate sensor threshold
3. Rate sensor la_ dtxe to filter and other time constants
4. Reaction jet transport lags
5. Switching hysteresis of on-off switch
6. Ratio of rate to attitude gain
7. Vehicle inertia
In addition, this sil-nple system is not stable in the absence of rate
information so that some sort of derived rate must be used when the rate
_yros are shut off.
It is therefore necessary to use some sort of pulse modulation or
other device to mini_ize or eliminate the effect of parameters 2 throuah 7.
A tradeoff study was conducted which considered four separate pulse
modulation systems to provide this function. Two of these systems are
conceptually quite similar but mechanized differently. The four systenas are:
I. Pseudo rate
2. Error pulsing mechanization A
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3. Error pulsing mechanization B
4. Pulse width and frequency modulation
The basic concept of pseudo rate is to take the output of the switchin_
amplifier which, as an on-off command to the jets, may be considered a
pseudo acceleration signal and integrate it to obtain pseudo rate information.
In practice, a first-order lag is used rather than an integrator for sinlplicity
of mechanization, and this is quite usable over a limited range. Pseudo
rate will provide stability within this range and convergence to a sin_zle
minimum-impulse limit cycle, completely eliminating the effects of
hysteresis and lags.
The error pulsing concepts are designed to produce pulses as a func-
tion of the error signal for a limited pulsing region. The pulses are sized
so that the control loop is stable within a limited region using attitude infor-
mation alone, and will converge to a single minimum-impulse limit cycle.
In mechanization A, the error levels at which pulses occur are at fixed
intervals, and the pulse widths are functions of the error at the start of the
pulse. In mechanization B, the error levels at which pulses occur are at
fixed intervals above the error when the previous pulse terminated; and the
pulse widths are a function of the error at the moment of pulse termination.
The pulse width and frequency modulation system generates pulses
whose duration and repetition rate are both functions of the error signal. A
simple mechanization was chosen which made the pulse duty cycle propor-
tional to the error signal. This design was not based on the desire to
achieve angular acceleration proportional to the error signal as in linear
systems, but to sinaply achieve the two end conditions of high acceleration
when needed and low average acceleration when approaching limit cycle to
eliminate the effects of lags. This system did not generate pulses which
produced stability without rate information as did the others. Thus, it
required a rate gyro or derived rate at all times. This was not considered
a handicap since the pulsing system was designed to eliminate the lags
inherent in derived rate by making the pulse rate function such that the
slowest pulse rate had an off time long enough for the rate sensing lag to
disappear. However, it was discovered that convergence to a single
(rather than multiple) mini_num impulse limit cycle was a function of rate-
to-attitude gain and vehicle torque-to-inertia ratio and that for some of the
parametric torque-to-inertia ratios considered, a moderately high rate-to-
attitude gain was required. In view of the unknown noise characteristics
and the necessity for derived rate, this rate-to-attitude gain requirement
was considered a handicap.
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For the tradeoff study, pencil and paper studies and analog computer
simulations were performed and a single-axis breadboard of each system
was constructed and tied into the analog simulation. The following data
give the tradeoff criteria used and the relative weighting factors.
Weighting Points Criteria
I00 Performance:
Ability to provide lowest limit cycle rate
Ability to provide best attitude accuracy
Ability to provide rapid convergence
Good control under steady and varying dis-
turbance torques
Propellant consumption
Authority for large errors
130
2OO
3O
Adaptability:
Ability to compensate for changes in sensor
outputs and jet perforn_ance
Ability to compensate for partial failures of
sensors oi: jets
Ability to accept changes in control
parameters
Compatibility with different mission modes
Reliability:
Parts count
Number of solenoid actuation cycles
Mechanization:
Weight
Power
V o him e
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Since the weighting factors used in these data are arbitrary, a great
deal of care must be used in their interpretation. Reliability was considered
of major importance since the system was the primary control path. Adapt-
ability was also rated quite high since most requirements had not yet been
specified or determined. Lesser emphasis was placed on performance
since each system was capable of meeting the basic performance require-
ments that were known, and the performance criteria were essentially
those which exceeded the requirements. The least emphasis was placed on
mechanization since these were only breadboards, and the prototype system
could differ radically in mechanization.
The evaulation ranked the four concepts in the following order:
Pseudo rate 413 points
Error pulsing B 350 points
Pulse width and frequency
modulation
300 points
Error pulsing A 220 points
The fourth-ranked error pulsing concept A was discarded on the basis
of a poor rating in reliability and adaptability. This mechanization, even
considering possible refinements to the breadboard, was the most complex
and least adaptable.
The pulse-width and frequency-modulation system, which ranked
third, was discarded for poor performance and adaptability. The low rating
in performance resulted from the requirement for derived rate together
with a high-rate gain and the necessity for a noise filter. A very low mini-
mum pulse rate was required to eliminate the time-lag effects. With these
conditions, analytical studies and computer simulations showed that rapid
convergence with fuel economy were difficult to achieve following a maneuver.
It was found that to achieve good convergence to a single pulse limit cycle
would impose an increased design restriction on deadband, rate-to-attitude
gain, etc. With restrictions innposed in these areas, any further changes
would prove difficult to accept; thus, the concept was graded low in
adaptability.
The final choice between pseudo rate and error pulsing B favored the
former because the circuit simplicity provided a higher predicted reliability.
Comparison in performance and adaptability showed that each was equally
acceptable. Thus, with reliability a heavy weighting factor, pseudo rate
achieved the highest score and was selected for mechanization.
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The attitude sensors considered in the preceding discussion were
always available to the ACS for purposes of control. These were assumed to
be proportional sensors-- generally inertial-type instruments. In the
original concept, however, the ACS was designed to operate not only with
the G&N platform and the SCS rate integrating gyros as attitude sensors,
but also with a sun sensor and a horizon scanner. These sensors arose
from a requirement for thermal attitude control with reference to the sun
and from a requirement for local vertical hold. These requirements were
changed, however, and all noninertial sensors were deleted early in the
design of the ACS.
It should also be noted here that early mechanization considerations
were based on dual reaction jet systems, a 100-pound thrust system, and a
5-pound thrust system. A jet select logic was also incorporated into the
ACS for purposes of propellant economy--rotation coi_nnands were given
precedence over translation commands because it was thought that rotation
corrections would be autolnatic in nature and of short duration during
periods of astronaut-produced translation commands.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problems
This section discusses the problems encountered in the development of
the attitude control subsystem. The problems described are those of mini-
mum impulse, passive thermal control, arc suppression, and switching.
Final solution to the first two problems still awaits further development,
although there have been no corresponding flight problems, whereas the
last two have been successfully resolved.
Minimum Impulse
The Apollo vehicle was originally designed (in the lunar-landing con-
figuration) to include two sets of service module reaction jets--100-pound-
thrust hypergolic engines and 5-pound thrust compressed cold gas engines.
The 100-pound thrust engines were originally sized to provide adequate roll
control during boost from the lunar surface when large rolI disturbance
torques were created by the ascent propulsion system. The 5-pound jets
were designed to provide vernier control for low-rate-limit cycle operation
and for stability during navigation sightings. Before the navigation sighting
rate requirement was known, it was estimated that convergence to rates of
about 0.0033 deg/sec (0.2 _ln/sec) would be required. The first written
requirement for navigation sighting rates was actually an order of magnitude
-- rain/see). Both these requirementsgreater than this 0. 033 deg/sec (2
were within the known minimum impulse capability of the 5-pound jets.
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With the advent of the lunar orbit rendezvous concept, the Apollo
vehicle was no longer required to land on the lunar surface; and a vehicle
redesign took place. Two recommendations were made at this redesign
(1) eliminate the 5-pound jet system to save weight and reduce complexity,
and (2) lower the thrust level of the hypergolic engines to 50 pounds which
would be adequate to meet all requirements. Recommendation (1) was
accepted and the 5-pound jet system was eliminated. Recommendation (2)
was not accepted because it would mean a slip in schedule, an increased
cost for engine redevelopment, and the possibility of development problems
occurring in the design of the lower thrust engines. It was felt that the
navigation sighting rate requirement could be satisfied with 100-pound
engines since the engine manufacturer believed the engines capable of pro-
ducing impulses less than one pound second (in the worst case axis - roll,
with a moment of inertia of about 12, 500 slug feet squared, a one-pound-
second impulse with a moment arm of 7 feet would produce a rate change of
less than 0.033 deg/sec).
At this time no small pulse altitude chamber test data were available
for the reaction jets but extrapolation of sea-level tests indicated that the
small pulse operation would be satisfactory. Because of the scarcity of
small-pulse data and the uncertainty of the sea-level-to-altitude extrapola-
tion, the ACS mechanization incorporated a closed-loop sensing device
which operated as follows: each reaction jet solenoid valve consisted of two
coils wound on the same core--an automatic coil operated by the control
system, and a direct coil operated by the astronaut's hand control. When
the automatic coil was energized, transformer action induced a voltage in
the direct coil. A sharp change in this voltage occurred when the poppet
actually moved, and this change was sensed by a special circuit. This cir-
cuit was used to latch the voltage on the automatic coil until the valve was
actually opened or 20 milliseconds had elapsed, whichever occurred first.
Thus, a short pulse to the automatic coil would produce a minimum impulse
from the engine independent of supply voltage, valve temperature, etc.
A design review of the minimum impulse _nechanization was subse-
quently held at which time it was decided that the closed-loop mechanization
was unnecessarily complex and adversely affected reliability. The lack of
adequate small pulse data was pointed out and while it could not be
shown that a closed-loop system was required based on the available data,
it was recommended that the closed-loop approach be maintained at least
until more definitive small pulse data could be obtained. The decision
resulting from the meeting however, was that the closed-loop mechanization
be deleted and that an open-loop system be designed which was less com-
plex. A cursory study to deternaine the required tolerance for an open-loop
pulse to meet the navigation sighting requirement under the effects of esti-
mated parameter variations was made using the only available test data
(which was taken from a single engine}. This investigation revealed that
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a pulsewidth was required that was always greater than 12 milliseconds and
always shorter than 11.8 milliseconds if a single precise pulse width were to
be used. Obviously, this was not possible. The navigation sighting rate
requirement was, therefore, relaxed to 0.04 deg/sec on a tentative basis.
At this point the engine manufacturer began small-pulse altitude
chamber testing, and more data began to become available. However, an
engine development problem appeared in the nature of a destructive explo-
sion of the engine which occurred during small pulse testing, and the test
program was delayed while this problem was investigated. The explosion
problem cause was never clearly determined, although it seemed to involve
mixture ratio mismatch and evaporative cooling effects caused by tolerances
in the operation times of the fuel and oxidizer valves at small pulse widths.
Nevertheless, an engine redesign took place and a "minimum safe pulse
width" constraint was placed on the minimum impulse mechanization.
Several open-loop pulsing system designs were investigated and, of
these, only two were capable of meeting the rate requirements. The first,
a precision (±4 percent) one-shot gave marginal performance, and was
rejected because of concern for the inadequacy of the test data. The design
that was chosen incorporated a one-shot to "latch" the automatic coil for a
minimum "on" duration which is a function of supply voltage: the lower the
supply voltage, the longer the pulse duration. This mechanization effectively
eliminated the variation in impulse due to variations in supply voltage and is
the design that is presently incorporated.
It had been assumed that the engine redesign had cured the explosion
problem. This year, however, the explosion problem reappeared in testing
the lunar module engines which are identical to the Apollo engines, but use
a different fuel. It is felt that the different propellant will prevent a similar
problem with the SM engines and tests are now under way to verify this.
Thermal Control Problem
A means of obtaining an approximately even solar thermal input to the
spacecraft during translunar and transearth midcourse flight is required
while still maintaining a desired attitude for uninterrupted earth communica-
tions. The thermal requirement is that the angle between the spacecraft
YZ plane and the sun line not exceed 20 degrees for any appreciable part of
the time. A spin-stabilized thermal cycling mode is planned to satisfy this
requirement and maintain the desired attitude for the duration of thermal
control (which may be as long as several days in the lunar-landing mission).
Spin stabilization is achieved by rotating the spacecraft about its
longitudinal (roll) axis and then disabling all further control. There are
several reasons why this type of spin stabilization might exceed the angular
pointing requirements.
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First, it may not be possible to start the roll motion smoothly. This
is influenced by such factors as (i) inertia cross products, (Z) residual
pitch and yaw rates, (3) propellant sloshing, (4) aerodynamic torques, and
(5) other disturbing torques such as rotating machinery, steam venting,
crew motion, earth's magnetic field, etc. The greatest problem regarding
vehicle attigude constraints is maintaining the spin motion. In order to
achieve an even thermal cycling, it is necessary to spin the spacecraft
about the roll axis at a rate of about one-fourth degree/second, which
requires about two to three minimum impulses from the roll reaction jets.
However, a disturbance in pitch corresponding to only one-half of one mini-
mum impulse (producing a pitch rate of about 0. 007 deg/sec) would cause a
wobble angle of greater than 10 degrees. A second problem is the presence
of energy dissipation. The spin motion about the smallest moment of
inertia axis (roll), which is normally stable for a rigid body, is not stable
in the presence of energy dissipation. In the Apollo vehicle, the propellant
motion in the tank is considered the largest energy sink and is the cause of a
large anticipated growth in the wobble angle. The effects of initial vehicle
rate and attitude errors, slosh mode parameters, and initial position of the
sloshing mass, and disturbance torques all contribute to the growth of the
wobble angle.
Recent studies using a closed-loop, six degree-of-freedom digital
simulation with low g propellant sloshing have shown wobble angles in
excess of 20 degrees in less than 20 minutes after starting spin-up with
initial pitch and yaw rates as low as 0. 009 deg/sec. Clearly, these results
would indicate that thermal control will be very difficult if not impossible to
achieve by spin stabilization, and no other method of thermal control has
been found that is acceptable in terms of propellant consumption and con-
trol system duty cycle. A thermal redesign of the spacecraft structure
would seem to be required in light of the above discussion. No such rede-
sign is anticipated, however, since there is a very low confidence in the
validity of the low energy, low g slosh model as applied to the problem of
roll-spin stabilization. This model has produced some physically unrea-
sonable results in digital simulations, and predictions based on it have not
been confirmed by any of the previous Apollo flights. A special test is
planned for spacecraft 101 (Apollo 7) to determine the characteristics of
low g propellant slosh. This test is designed to determine the characteris-
tics of a higher confidence level slosh model and the feasibility of spin
stabilization. If this test should demonstrate, however, that spin stabiliza-
tion is not feasible, some alternate solution (presently unknown) to the
thermal problem must be found which fits within the allowable budget for
RCS propellant consumption and control system duty cycle.
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Arc Suppression of RCS Solenoids
Associated with each RCS engine are two solenoid valves-- one for fuel
and one for oxidizer. Each of these valves represents a highly inductive
load drawing several amperes. Protection of the driver amplifiers required
that arc suppression circuitry be provided to limit the voltage spike which
appears across the output stage of the amplifier when the automatic coil of
the valve is turned off. Any arc suppression or voltage limiting placed
across the coil will, of course, increase the drop-out time of the valve and
thereby increase the minimum impulse of the engine. The arc suppression
circuitry was therefore designed to limit the voltage spike to the highest
value that could be tolerated by the driver amplifier. A simplified version
of this arc suppression circuitry is shown in Figure 5-3. No problems
occurred with this circuit and, given the required limiting voltage, the
attendant drop-out deIay has to be considered part of the minimum impulse.
Arc suppression of the direct coils, on the other hand, did prove to
be a problem. The direct switches in the rotation control need protection
against arcing and the limiting voltage had to be lower than used on the
automatic coil. It was determined that the limiting voItage could not be
greater than 20 volts. The problem with this was that the direct coil arc
suppression allowed energy storage not only for operation of the direct coil,
but also for the automatic coil. The resulting lag in the automatic coil
drop-out was unacceptable from the standpoint of minimum impulse. It was
at first decided to place the arc suppression circuitry up-stream of the
direct enable switch. It would, therefore, be across the coil only when the
direct system was enabled and have no effect on the automatic coil when the
direct system was not enabled. It turned out that this was not an acceptable
solution because the astronauts decided to leave the direct system enabled
at all times (except if it had n_alfunctioned) so that it would be immediately
available in case of an emergency. As a result, several designs were
formulated to remove direct arc suppression when minimum impulse control
was required. One such design used relay switching so that arc suppression
was incorporated only upon actuation of the direct coil and removed after a
fixed time delay had elapsed following removal of the direct command.
These designs were all complex and had an adverse effect on reliability.
It was a fortunate circumstance that the R.CS solenoids were undergoing
a redesign at this time and the direct coil characteristics were designed so
that they could be wired in series. By wiring the direct coils in series
rather than in parallel and in such a manner that the phases were opposing,
the mechanization shown in Figure 5-3 was possible. With this mechaniza-
tion, the induced effects cancelled, and deterioration of the minimum
impulse was negligible.
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Switching
Early tradeoff studies were made between'_hot side" and "ground
side" switching of the RCS solenoids. The basic objection to ground-side
switching was the fail-safe criterion. A considerable length of wire exists
between the driver amplifiers in the command module and the jet solenoids
in the service module; any of these wires shorting to ground would cause
the reaction jets to fail"on" if ground side switching is used whereas if hot
side switching is used, the system is relatively fail safe (a short to ground
would only cause loss of a jet). In favor of ground-side switching, however,
was the fact that at the time of the design the only high reliability silicon
transistors available which could handle the currents required for valve
operation were NPN devices. To use hot side switching with NPN transistors
would have required more switches and a separate power supply. It was
considered desirable to use spacecraft dc power directly and ground-side
switching was chosen. This decision was made acceptable by the fact that
such a failure of the jet could be disabled by shutting off the propellant to a
quad (group of 4 jets) by means of a propellant isolation valve. The system
was designed to be able to complete its mission with one quad (of four)
disabled. No failure of the type described has occurred so far in any of the
Apollo flights.
Change s
The only significant functionai change made to the ACS was the
removal of the jet select logic with the Block II redesign. The purpose of
the jet select logic was to resolve conflicts between rotation and translation
commands to the jets. Since the same jets were used to provide both rota-
tion and translation, conflict between simultaneous commands coulct occur.
The primary cause of conflict was the offset center-of-gravity location.
Translation commands by the astronaut cause both translation and rotation;
the vehicle rotational errors were sensed by the autopilot and commands
were given to the jets to stop the rotation. This action would have resulted
in commands to opposing jets, thereby wasting fuel. The jet select logic
resolved this conflict by inhibiting the opposing jets. During the Block II
redesign a study was run to determine for a particular mission just how
much propellant was saved by the jet select logic. It was felt that the extra
propellant was insignificant and that simplification of the electronics was
desirable. The jet select logic was therefore removed.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the operation and performance of this subsystem has been
entirely satisfactory during the spacecraft flights and developmental problems
do not suggest any changes, there are no significant hindsight suggestions.
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6.0 ENTRY CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
This section discusses the entry control subsystem (ECS) of the SCS.
The purpose of this subsystem is to provide backup flight-control capability
to the primary mode of entry. The control system is similar to the reaction
control system previously discussed except that it uses the Command
Module (CM) reaction jets rather than the service module jets. The system
also contains coupling from the roll axis into the yaw axis so as to reduce yaw
jet firings when controlling about the roll stability axis.
The development and operation of this subsystem has been free of any
major problems. The only problem discussed here has to do with operational
procedures to prevent a runaway jet from depleting the propellant supply.
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The entry control subsystem is contained within the stabilization and
control system. It is composed of the electronics necessary to accept
command signals from the rotation hand controls, rate and attitude error
signals from the attitude reference subsystem, and configuration switching
signals from the main control panel. The entry control subsystem provides
on-off commands to the command module reaction jets to control vehicle
rotational motion.
Functions
The entry control subsystem operates during two distinct phases of a
normal mission: (I) the extra-atmospheric portion subsequent to command-
service module separation and prior to sensible atnaospheric drag deceler-
ation (0.05 g), and (2) atmospheric entry subsequent to 0.05 g drag and prior
to deployment of the recovery system (parachutes). During the first phase,
the aerodynamic torques acting on the vehicle are small relative to the CM
RCS control torques, and the entry control systen_ is capable of providing a
backup to the primary system by accepting rotation hand control commands
to maneuver the command module about all three axes. During the second
phase, large aerodynamic restoring moments cause the command module to
maintain trim angles of attack and sideslip and the entry control system pro-
vides only rate damping in these axes while still accepting rotation commands
in roll for controlling the aerodynamic lift vector direction
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Mechanization
The entry control subsystem provides the same options for manual
override as does the attitude control system described elsewhere in this
report and uses the same driver amplifiers as does the ACS and the primary
control system.
A block diagram of the entry control systen_ is shown in Figure 6-I.
This system is functionally the same as the ACS except that pseudo rate is
removed (by manual switching), the gains are changed, and roll-yaw coupling
is included. The switch configurations are shown in the post 0.5 g positions.
The operation of the system is described in the following paragraph.
The rate signal from the attitude reference subsystem is summed with
the rate-command signals from the rotation hand control to form a rate-error
signal. After 0.05 g switching, the yaw rate error term has coupled to it the
sensed roll rate multiplied by a tangent a gain - the o used is the design trim
angle of attack. The purpose of this coupling is to minimize yaw jet firings
which would be commanded in an attempt to reduce body yaw motion to zero
rates. This is not desirable in the presence of roll commands since the
aerodynamic stability is achieved about axes other than body axes, thereby
forcing yaw rates. Propellant is saved by minin_izing these yaw firings, and
allowing the yaw rates which would be produced by commanded roll motion.
Attitude error signals prior to 0.05 g switching are processed through a
selectable deadband and added to the rate error signal to form a total error.
These attitude error signals are removed subsequent to 0. 05 g switching.
When the total error signal exceeds a fixed threshold, the driver amplifiers
are turned on in such a manner as to cause the comnaand module reaction jets
to fire and reduce the error signal. This type of control is a typical limit
switching system which provides rate damping and attitude hold.
The command module reaction jets used for vehicle control are com-
posed of two redundant sets (systems A and B) of six engines each. These
engines are on-off or pound-thrust ablatively cooled hypergolic reaction jets
using hydrazine as a fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
This section describes the constraints, requirements, and ground rules
used to define the performance of the present Block I! entry control sub-
system. In most cases the present performance requirements differ from
the original requirements in magnitude - but in no case are they restrictive.
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Requirements
The entry control subsystem must be capable of holding vehicle attitude
(prior to 0. 05 g) in all three axes and must be capable of accepting rotation
commands from the astronaut and providing rate damping at all times through-
out the entry phase of the mission using a single RCS system (six jets)
without running out of propellant.
The following data summarize the entry control system parameters and
their defining requirements.
Parameter
Rate deadband
Attitude deadband
Maximum
Minimuna
Rate-to-aLtitude gain
Maximum commanded
roll rate
Value
2 deg/sec
8 deg
4 deg
0. 5 deg/sec
2Z. 5°/sec
Requirement
Propellant minimization
Propellant minimization and
attitude hold for preentry
Propellant minimization
Lift-vector orientation
Design Requirement Tradeoffs
The entry control subsystem was initially conceived as the primary
control system for the entry phase of the Apollo mission (i.e., that portion
of the mission subsequent to command-service module separation and prior
to deployment of the recovery system) including the atmospheric entry phase
following aborts. The prime function of the entry control subsystem was to
provide the capability of executing a safe entry and to adequately control the
trajectory so that the command module could be landed at a preselected
landing site.
The initial design tradeoff studies were primarily concerned with
system configuration. An initial ground rule was to utilize the ACS and
service module control systena components wherever possible; for this
reason, on-off reaction jets were chosen as control devices requiring that the
entry system be configured as an on-off control system (nonthrottleable).
The primary tradeoffs were therefore concerned with the methods of
switching the jets on and off, the thrust sizing of the jets, and their physical
location. For the purposes of these studies, the following assumptions were
made regarding the SCS system and entry requirements.
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°
Three-axis control is required prior to development of aero-
dynamic moments
2.. Roll control is required throughout entry
,
Command module reaction jets will be used only after separation
from the service module
. Two independent, redundant systems of reaction jets and propellant
will be available capable of meeting torque and propellant storage
requirements
, Each RCS system will be capable of being isolated by electrical
means and by propellant valves, and failure detection will have to
be considered
.
Rate and attitude sensors will be provided for use by other systems
(ACS and TVC), and these will be available for use by the entry
control system
. Limit-cycle operation of the jets in pitch and yaw essentially stops
once the aerodynamic forces build up. Thus, the minimum-impulse
capability requirement is greatly reduced compared to service
module requirements.
The earliest tradeoff conducted after choosing an on-off system was
that of determining the reaction jet thrust magnitude. The effects considered
were:
Trajectory Effects: to provide a safe entry and to adequately
control the vehicle to achieve a preselected landing site. Two
effects were considered, (1) roll angle sensitivity and (2) minimum
propellant consumption. Since the lift vector can only be effec-
tively controlled by rolling the vehicle, the entry control system
must be able to provide rapid roll response to prevent skipout and
excessive g loads and provide adequate ranging. Because a low
maneuver roll rate is desired, the response time becomes strictly
a function of reaction jet thrust level if the maneuver roll rate is
fixed.
_° Aerodynamic Damping Effects: should disturbances produce
deviations in the angle of attack and the angle of sideslip, the jets
must provide suitable thrust to damp the vehicle rates.
o Failures: the reaction jet thrust may be critical in the event of
certain failures. Thus, single RCS system thrust levels must be
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adequate in the event of a system failure. The entry control sub-
system may be required to dannp large tumbling rates and to
reorient the command module from apex forward to aft heat shield
forward in high-dynamic pressure environments following aborts.
Thrust levels of 50 to ZOO pounds were considered and their perfor-
mance evaluated with respect to the above conditions (except 3). Under the
worst-case simulations performed, all thrust levels investigated were capable
of meeting the performance requirements. From a propellant consumption
standpoint, the optimum thrust level was about 70 pounds with the values of
inertia used in the study. It was also found that propellant economy per-
formance was relatively insensitive to thrust level at the optimum and
higher values.
The thrust level of 100 pounds was chosen based on the fact that this
value was almost optimum and consideration of the possibility that perform-
ance margin might be necessary to offset any future changes (such as
inertia increases, etc. ). The same value of thrust was chosen for all axes
with a view toward economy.
The major factor not considered in this thrust sizing was the require-
ment for performance following an abort (condition 3). This requirement
required turning the command module around in a high-dynamic pressure
environment. However, it soon became obvious that none of the thrust
levels studied was high enough to overcome the aerodynamic moments once
the command module had been captured in an apex forward attitude and that
this was not a primary factor to be considered in sizing the jets. Other
methods were considered for performing (or eliminating the necessity for)
this turnaround maneuver. Before describing the various means of handling
this problem, a discussion of the apex forward capture is in order.
The Apollo command module was designed to enter the earth's
atmosphere aft end first. The aft heat shield has therefore been designed to
accommodate the high laeat loads to be expected. The requirement for
orienting the command module aft end forward during entry stems from the
necessity of deploying the parachutes and jettisoning the boost protective
cover (if still on) in a manner compatible with their structural design and
to avoid imposing undesirable "eyeballs out" acceleration loads on ti_e crew.
During entry from a normal mission, li_is orientation requirement does not
pose a problem. There is s,lfficient time in a normal mission for the crew
to reorient the command module before the dynamic pressure builds up.
Following a boost abort, the situation is different. The command module is
removed from the boost vehicle by the launch escape system with the apex
forward in a possibly high dynamic pressure environment. Since the
command module has a stable trim point apex forward if the launch escape
system were jettisoned wlnile the vehicle was in stable flight following an
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abort, the command module could turn apex forward and the RCS engines
would be unable to turn the vehicle around.
Consideration was given to a mechanization of the entry control sub-
system so that, in the case of apex forward capture, the system could be
made unstable, that is, positive feedback introduced in such a manner as to
make the apex forward condition unstable. This would not be a "brute force"
approach but, rather, would require several diverging oscillations which
would eventually turn the command module around; the feedback would be
made stabilizing when the turnaround had been accomplished and would
converge to a stable aft heat shield forward attitude. Simulations showed
that this type of operation was feasible and well within the reaction jet cap-
ability. However, it was discovered that both the primary and secondary
attitude references would likely be lost because of vehicle tumbling following
a high-altitude abort; and the crew would have to determine vehicle attitude
with respect to the flight path through the windows with visual reference to
the ground. Because of the time criticality of this maneuver and the uncer-
tain condition of the crew following abort, this approach was rejected.
Several other mechanizations were investigated including wings or strakes
on the command module apex to eliminate the stable point, but none of these
mechanizations was satisfactory over the entire dynamic range of aborts.
The final system decided upon utilizes deployable canards on the apex of the
launch escape motor. This mechanization effectively imparts the necessary
reorientation rates to the command module. The only entry control sub-
system requirement is to establish a pitch rate of 5 degrees per second for
high-altitude aborts to eliminate a weak launch escape vehicle apex forward
trim point that exists for high roach numbers. This function is easily pro-
vided by astronaut command since tumbling does not cause a loss of rate
reference.
Another early tradeoff study was made to determine whether attitude
error signals generated by the guidance system for entry steering should
be left in body axis coordinates or transformed to trim axes for use by the
entry control subsystem. Studies indicated that, if a yaw jet were to fail in
the off condition, the use of trim axes would result in instability which would
not be present if body axes were used. However, it was felt that the use of
body axes could result in large roll angle errors in the guidance system and,
since the entry control system was the primary system and responsible for
achieving the desired range capability, it was decided to use the trim axes.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problems
The only problems encountered in the design of the entry control sub-
system were minor in nature and had little impact on the specific design of
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the system. Among these, perhaps the most significant was the problem of a
runaway jet failure. There are two redundant reaction jet systems used on
the command module, and each system has its own independent propellant
supply. If both systems are operating in parallel, a runaway jet, if undetected,
could completely use up the available propellant in both systems. The loss
of propellant before being able to deploy the parachutes would probably result
in unrecoverable tumbling of the vehicle and therefore must be avoided.
However, there exists considerable doubt as to whether or not an astronaut
would be able to detect a runaway jet in pitch or yaw during the high-dynamic
pressure environment. These considerations dictate the need for either
providing automatic runaway jet detection or for using only a single system
at a time. It had been determined, however, that severe wind gusts could be
encountered during the terminal phase of entry and, under these conditions,
the presence of destabilizing aerodynamic damping derivatives could cause
the aerodynamic effects to exceed the control authority of a single RCS
system and cause tumbling. While these problems were being considered,
however, Spacecraft 009 (Apollo i) was flown. Evaluation of the telemetry
data from this flight indicated that the aerodynamic damping derivatives
were not destabilizing, and it was decided to use a single system at a time.
A tradeoff study was also run to determine whether pseudo rate (as
described in the ACS section) was desirable for entry operation. The con-
clusion was drawn that it was desirable from the point of view of propellant
consumption during preentry (prior to 0. 05 g), but highly undersirable in the
presence of large aerodynamic moments. The question was whether to lock
out pseudo rate during entry or leave it to the astronaut to make sure pseudo
rate is absent, since function switching rather than n_ode switching had been
implemented on Block II. However, it was decided not to provide a lockout
since there were numerous switch combinations equally as catastrophic,
and it would not be practical to provide a lockout for every one of them.
Changes
The first major change in the entry control system was in early 1964.
The cross-coupling gain was changed due to a decrease in the spacecraft lift-
to-drag ratio from 0. 5 to 0. 34. Without the gain change, the expected entry
propellant consumption would have doubled.
The second major change occurred at the time of the redesign for
Block II. Since the SCS was redesigned as a backup mode, no ranging
requirements were imposed on the subsystem. Functional switching was
used instead of mode switching, and the interface \vith the guidance system
was eliminated.
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CONCLUSIONS
Because of the looseness of the entry control system performance
requirements and the conservative design employed, there were no major
problems or changes which occurred during its development.
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7.0 CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS SUBSYSTEM
This section discusses the control and display subsystem (see Fig-
ures 7-I and 7-2). This subsystem provides the hand controllers, flight
instruments, and dial settings necessary for the astronaut to monitor and
control the spacecraft during various flight modes. The principal develop-
ment problem associated with the controls and displays has been fractures in
the cabling for the hand controllers. The design tradeoffs between durability,
flexibility, and flammability have been so difficult that an advance in the
design of flexible cabling may be the final solution and could represent one of
the more significant outputs of the spacecraft program.
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Functions
The Apollo SCS control and display subsystem provides the following
spacecraft control and display functions:
Control Functions
Translation Controller (See Figure 7-3)
i. Provides manual acceleration control of spacecraft (CSM combin-
ation only) rectilinear motion in both directions along the three
principal axes.
. Initiates a CSM/S-IVB abort command to the spacecraft mission
sequencer via CCW rotation of the controller handle.
. Transfers spacecraft thrust vector control from the CMC to the
SCS via CW rotation of the controller handle.
4. Is capable of simultaneous multi-axis actuation.
Rotational Controller (See Figure 7-4)
Ii Provides manual proportional body rate commands or direct
angular acceleration, via switch selection, for spacecraft rota-
tional motion in both directions about the three principal axes
from breakout switch actuation (I. 5 degrees travel from neutral)
to the soft stops (10 degrees).
. Provides manual proportional SPS engine gimbal position control
in pitch and yaw during manual thrust vector control.
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Figure 7 -3. Translation Control 
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Figure 7 - 5. Attitude Set C ontrol Panel 
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o Provides emergency angular acceleration commands directly to
the RCS jet solenoids via controller emergency direct switches
(ll degrees).
4. Is capable of simultaneous multi-axis actuation.
Attitude Set Control Panel (AS/CP (See Figure 7-5)
. Provides selectable, three axls, spacecraft inertial pointing
signals via thumbwheel controls and dial readouts. These signals
are summed with either the PGNCS IMU or SCS CDC inertial
attitude signals to produce total attitude error signals which are
displayed on the FDAI attitude error needles to allow precision
manual rotation maneuvers to the selected inertial angles.
Display Functions
Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI) (See Figure 7-6)
. Provides an inside-out display of spacecraft attitude with respect
to a selected inertial frame of reference via a graduated three-
axis ball and appropriate reference indices.
. Provides a fly-to display of spacecraft angular position relative to
an inertial reference in all three axes via attitude-error needles.
. Provides a fly-to display of spacecraft angular rate about each of
the three mutually perpendicular spacecraft body axes prior tothe
0.05 g level during entry. After 0. 05 g, the displays provide
angular rate about the spacecraft body pitch axis and the roll and
yaw entry axes.
Gimbal Position and Fuel Pressure Indicator (See Figure 7-7)
i.
_o
.
1
Displays S-II fuel and oxidizer pressure on one of the sets of
redundant meter movements during boost.
Displays S-IVB fuel and oxidizer pressure on the other set of
redundant meter movements during boost.
Displays angular position of the service module main propulsion
engine gimbal about the pitch and yaw axes, one on each of the
dual sets of meter movenlents.
Provides a means for manually inserting initial condition command
signals into the actuator servo systems for both pitch and yaw by
means of thumbwheel controls.
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Figure 7 - 5. Attitude Set C ontrol Panel 
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Figure 7-7. Gimbal Position / Fuel Pressure Indicator 
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Mechanization
The translation and rotation hand controllers were mechanized to the
specific requirements listed in Appendix A. The requirements for the rota-
tion hand controllers were imposed on the contractor by NASA at the request
of the astronauts. In particular, the shape of the hand grip and the "feel"
characteristics of the device were considered to be significant enough to
warrant this approach.
Design Features
During the period of the Block II design, the SCS main instrument
panel displays were reviewed and a new requirement was established to
separate the displays into separate instruments which provided more flexi-
bility in arranging the panel instruments. The result of this requirement
was to separate the Block I attitude set gimbal position display into an
attitude set control panel and a gimbal position indicator.
During this same period, another requirement was established to
utilize the gimbal position indicator as a means to display fuel and oxidizer
pressures from the second and third stages of the Saturn V boost vehicle.
Since the new display was to provide redundant scales for both the SPS pitch
and yaw axis, and the meter movements were changed from a galvanometric
to a servometric type, this interface with the booster pressure transducers
was not difficult to achieve.
DESIGN RE QUIREMENTS
The major requirement or ground rules imposed on the SCS controls
and displays by the customer for Block II are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Attitude Display
I. No single failure in the total G&C system will result in a loss of
the following:
a. Gross attitude information displayed on the FDAI sphere
b. Attitude errors displayed on the FDAI attitude-error needles
c. Attitude rates displayed on the FDAI rate needles.
Z. No single failure in the total O&C system will require the use of
a rate command or attitude hold mode to a]ign the spacecraft for
thrusting maneuvers.
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_o No two failures in the G&C systems will result in a loss of roll
attitude information for use during the entry phase.
. There will be two FDAI's of equal status. Either FDAI will be
accessible to the prime or SCS system at all times.
o Since the IMU is to be aligned with the spacecraft body axes, the
FDAI ball will be a straight axis ball (i. e., axes aligned with the
spacecraft body axes).
, The FDAI ball will not accept attitude information directly from
the SCS except in entry, when roll will be displayed on an FDAI.
. All three attitude angles, attitude errors, and angular rates will
be displayed in all situations where the crew is monitoring auto-
matic attitude functions or when performing manual attitude
functions except during entry.
Performance requirements for the FDAI are given in Table 7-1.
The requirements for the ball are closely related to the type of
maneuver and reference system available. In most cases the Apollo vehicle
will be moving very slowly and accurate all-attitude readout is desirable.
The known use of rate indication to provide a basis for manual control inputs
to minimize fuel and to control the undamped vehicle motions in relation to
desired attitude was to be emphasized. The display design is such as to
allow acquisition of precise attitudes in minimum time or minimum fuel
conditions.
The considerations for the selection of the FDAI for Apollo can be
itemized as follows.
i° Improved pilot performance in holding attitude during AV
thrusting maneuvers
. Direct visual monitoring of IMU precludes gimbal lock in
maneuvering and hence imposes a minimum constraint on vehicle
maneuver s
. Improves crew ability to monitor launch program and in detecting
catastrophic failure necessitating abort
, Provides capability to monitor IMU-CMC (command module
computer) condition by comparing precision and general attitude
readouts with visual information on a one-to-one basis
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Apollo Attitude lndic ato r 
System Requirements 
Provide full (360 degree) 
attitude refe r e nce orienta -
tion in thre e axes 
Provide means of displaying 
attitude referenc e , error , 
and r a t e centrally for mon -
itoring and executing com -
plex' multi-axes maneuvers 
Provide means of di.splaying 
various r eferences ( e . g . , 
celestial, loc a l vert ic a l) for 
operator orientation 
Provide continuous indica -
tion of vehicle attitude with 
respect to chosen reference 
coo rdinat e frame 
Provide precise atti tud e 
r eferenc e inform at ion dur-
ing engin e thrusting a nd 
navigational sigh tin g phases 
Provide indic ation of vehicle 
angul ar velocity in three 
axes using varying scal e 
factors . 
Provide indication of vehicle 
deviation from preselected 
o ri entation using varying 
scale factors. 
Display r eferf'nce systems 
limitations during 
maneuvers 
Tabl e 7-1. FDA! Characteristics 
FDAl Functions 
Centralized display of 
attitudes, vehicle rates , 
and a ttitud e error 5 
Coar s e attitude orienta-
tion , obtainable with the 
ball, and fine orienta-
tion using attitude error 
pointers 
Defines IMU maneuver 
limits and th e approach 
of these limits during 
maneuvers 
Provides monitor and 
c r oss - check of co ndi -
tions of reference 
equipment by compar -
ing body axis rates 
adj acent to body axis 
att itud e errors 
Provides monitor of 
SCS execution of r efer -
ence system commands 
in thre e axes by thr ee 
command ne e dles 
Variable scale factors 
in r ate and error ind i -
cation for varying pr e -
cision of nlaneuvers 
required in different 
mission phases 
Range 
0, ~ <jJ 360 deg rees 
Other 
Entry Phases 
o ± 50° / sec ± l o/sec 
~ ±50/sec ±lo/sec 
~± 250/sec ±lo/sec 
Other 
Entry Phases 
0 ±500 ±5° 
erro r 
& ±200 
I 
±50 
erroi..~ 
<jJ erro.r ±200 ± 5° 
Readout Accuracy 
Entry 
±20/sec 
2 degrees 
Other 
Phases 
± 0 . 050/sec 
± O. 10/sec ±0.050 /s ec 
±lo/sec 
Entry 
±2° 
at null 
± 2° 
± 2° 
±0 . 050/sec 
Other 
Phases 
±0.5° 
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CONFIGURATION 
CONTROL PANEL 
(J) 
8 MODE SW 
0.05gB/ USW 
DEADBAND SEL 
B/ U RATE SW 
CHANNEL DISABLE 
NO COOLING 
DELETE MODE 
SWITCHING 
ADD FUNCT IONAL 
SW ITCHING 
I DELETE MODE SWITCHI NG ADD FUNCTIONAL SWITCHING 
._--, 
-----
'" 66 FUNCTIONAL 
SWITCHES ON 
Sic PANELS 
ROTATION CONTROL 
(2) 
3 B/ O SW ( J PER AXIS) 
SOFT STOP -ROLL 
G RIP INCLINED 10° FWD 
NON-SYM G RIP 
24 WIRES/CAB LE 
~ 
ADD DIRECT MODE 
ADD MTVC 
FUNCTION 
~ 
ADD DIRECT MODE 
ADD MTVC 
ADD P/ T/ T SW 
ADD CMC INTERFACE 
~ 
ROTATION CONTROL 
(2) 
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Figure 7 - 8. Evolution of SCS C o ntr ols and Displays 
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, The controller will be provided with a means of mechanically
locking it to a null. The locking mechanism will have no effect
on the rotary motions of the grip. The locking mechanism will
provide a visual indication of its locked-unlocked condition.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problems
Listed below are the major design and development problems which
occurred during the design of the Block II SCS controls and displays.
FDAI
Spacecraft Installation. During the development of the new Block II
FDAI with its instrument panel backmounting feature, the need to support a
thermal coldplate from the rear face presented a major vibration suscepti-
bility probIem. Since the FDAI was cantilevered from its front face, the
need arose to provide structural support at its rear face and yet not interfere
with the coldplate. The design solution was to redesign the coldplate with
through holes, modify the FDAI backplate to receive supporting pins, and
add supporting pins to the secondary structure. The obvious impact of this
design was the loss of ready access for maintainability purposes for both
the FDAI and the coldplate.
Needle Vibration. Because of the slenderness, length, and canti-
levered support of the attitude error needles, redesign was required as a
result of vibration testing. These needles were ruggedized to withstand the
vibration environment.
Electroluminescent Lighting. When the Block tI control and Display
redesign was instituted, NR implemented the use of integra[ electrolumi-
nescent (E/L)-type lighting. To begin with, the SCS subcontractor
experienced difficulties in orienting commercial vendors to aerospace-
type requirements. In addition, problems were encountered with the
consistency of E/L lamp characteristics, with the reflections and aberations
from nearby surfaces, and with the uniformity of light intensity and color.
These problems were ultimately resolved but NR was forced to change the
E/L lighting power and power factor requirements. It was found that
better lamp operation was obtained when the supply voltage is higher than
the nominal spacecraft voltage.
Lighting Control. A variac transformer is part of the spacecraft
wiring so that display lighting intensity can be varied. The current surge
resulting from on-off operation of this control loads down the ac inverter
resulting in line-voltage variations. These voltage variations cause the
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, No two failures in the G&C systems will result in a loss of roll
attitude information for use during the entry phase.
, There will be two FDAI's of equal status. Either FDAI will be
accessible to the prime or SCS system at all times.
o Since the IMU is to be aligned with the spacecraft body axes, the
FDAI ball will be a straight axis ball (i.e., axes aligned with the
spacecraft body axes).
. The FDAI ball will not accept attitude information directly from
the SCS except in entry, when roll will be displayed on an FDAI.
. All three attitude angles, attitude errors, and angular rates will
be displayed in all situations where the crew is monitoring auto-
matic attitude functions or when performing manual attitude
functions except during entry.
Performance requirements for the FDAI are given in Table 7-i.
The requirements for the ball are closely related to the type of
maneuver and reference system available. In most cases the Apollo vehicle
will be moving very slowly and accurate all-attitude readout is desirable.
The known use of rate indication to provide a basis for manual control inputs
to minimize fuel and to control the undamped vehicle motions in relation to
desired attitude was to be emphasized. The display design is such as to
allow acquisition of precise attitudes in minimum time or minimum fuel
conditions.
The considerations for the selection of the FDAI for Apollo can be
itemized as follows:
i. Improved pilot performance in holding attitude during AV
thrusting maneuvers
. Direct visual monitoring of IMU precludes gimbal lock in
maneuvering and hence imposes a minimum constraint on vehicle
maneuver s
° Improves crew ability to monitor launch program and in detecting
catastrophic failure necessitating abort
. Provides capability to monitor IMU-CMC (command module
computer) condition by comparing precision and general attitude
readouts with visual information on a one-to-one basis
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5. Provides a convenient monitor of SCS performance to PGNCS
commands, via the command needles, in direct cross-check
with angular information.
6. Provides a means of executing nonprogrammed maneuvers
7. Provides a check on reaction jet performance via rate response
to commanded jet firings.
8. Provides for recovery from tumbling via rate information
9. Provides a gross indication of entry flight path angle
10. Display concept provides a familiar link to previous pilot training
and conditioning.
Attitude Controller
Two identical three-axis hand controllers are supplied, one for the
command pilot (right-arm rest of left-hand seat) and one for the pilot
(left-arm rest of the right-hand seat).
An MSC-irnposed specification controlled the design details of these
devices by specifying:
I. Controller forces (via torque versus deflection curves)
2. Controller deflection limits to soft stops and hard stops
3. Controller axes orientations
4. Controller axes relative locations to pilot axes
. Control system mode actuation points within controller
deflections
6. Hand grip form factor.
Translation Controller
I° One translation hand controller was supplied with the necessary
built-in redundancy for reliability.
2. The controller will be connected to the system without provisions
for switching out its signals.
o The controller will be provided with a dovetail to provide a means
of securing it to a place of usage or storage.
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.
The controller will be provided with a means of mechanically
locking it to a null. The locking mechanism will have no effect
on the rotary n_otions of the grip. The locking mechanism will
provide a visual indication of its locked-unlocked condition.
PROBLEMS AND CHANGES
Problems
Listed below are the major design and development problems which
occurred during the design of the Block II SCS controls and displays.
FDAI
Spacecraft Installation. During the development of the new Block II
FDAI with its instrument panel backmounting feature, the need to support a
thermal coldplate from the rear face presented a major vibration suscepti-
bility problem. Since the FDAI was cantilevered from its front face, the
need arose to provide structural support at its rear face and yet not interfere
with the coldplate. The design solution was to redesign the coldplate with
through holes, modify the FDAI backplate to receive supporting pins, and
add supporting pins to the secondary structure. The obvious impact of this
design was the loss of ready access for maintainability purposes for both
the FDAI and the coldplate.
Needle Vibration. Because of tile slenderness, length, and canti-
levered support of the attitude error needles, redesign was required as a
result of vibration testing. These needles were ruggedized to withstand the
vibration environment.
Electroluminescent Lighting. When the Block II control and Display
redesign was instituted, NR implemented the use of integral electrolumi-
nescent (E/L)-type lighting. To begin with, the SCS subcontractor
experienced difficulties in orienting commercial vendors to aerospace-
type requirements. In addition, problems were encountered with the
consistency of E/L lamp characteristics, with the reflections and aberations
from nearby surfaces, and with the uniformity of light intensity and color.
These problems were ultin_ately resolved but NR was forced to change the
E/L lighting power and power factor requirements. It was found that
better lamp operation was obtained when the supply voltage is higher than
the nominal spacecraft voltage.
Lighting Control. A variac transformer is part of the spacecraft
wiring so that display lighting intensity can be varied. The current surge
resulting from on-off operation of this control loads down the ac inverter
resulting in line-voltage variations. These voltage variations cause the
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rate sensors to oscillate, resulting in inadvertant reaction jet firings. To
minimize the effect of this, a resistor was put across the variac and the
spacecraft operational procedures changed so that the display lights are
dimmed and not turned off.
AS/CP
Drift. During vibration testing, it was found that the attitude set
thumbwheels would slowly drift. To preclude this problem, friction-type
discs were incorporated into the thumbwheel support mechanism.
Hand Controllers
Cabling. Major problems have occurred with the cables emanating
from both the rotational and transiational controls. Because of their
exposed positions in the command module cabin, they have been subjected
to excessive wear and tear during checkout. Constant movement and
stowage have flexed the cables until cracks appear. Deletion of the outer
cable covering exposed a Teflon braid which had no abrasion or puncture
resistance. Other nonflammable materials, when applied to the cables,
were either not flexible enough or cracked when flexed. Strain relief of the
cables, where they exit from the enclosures, was a major problem in that
the excessive strains actually encountered were not originally envisioned
and consequently not specified in the initial design requirements.
The subsequent tradeoff among material flammability, durability, and
flexibility characteristics has proven to be extremely difficult. Solution of
this problem, still in the development stage, may prove to be a significant
design advance for exposed cabling. The present solution is to use a speciai
covering and to restrict the use of the hand controller during the ground test
phase. Also, an alternate controller is used during this time period.
Handle Shape and Force Characteristics. The design of the handle
shape and the force versus deflection characteristics are a subjective
requirement, and experienced a long and tedious process of evolution. Con-
tinual iteration of the design went on for several years during the middle
time period of the program. These iterations occurred even after hardware
commitments had been made. A belated solution was the generation by the
customer of the specifications presented in Appendix A.
Changes
The SCS control and display subsystem had one major evolutionary
cycle, from a functional standpoint, which occurred during mid-1964 when
the Block II system was conceived (see Figure 7-8). The original Block I
control and display subsystena was comprised of eight devices:
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One control panel
Two rotational controllers
Two translational controllers
One flight director attitude indicator
One attitude set/gimbal position indicator
One velocity change indicator
These devices provided the crew with the capability to effect either auto-
matic or manuaI control of the spacecraft and to visually display its reactions
to control inputs. It was the primary control system for the vehicle and, as
such, was classified as a criticality I system, i.e., a system whose
continued performance was required to meet the established crew safety
criterion. The number of displays and controls utilized, their relative
locations within the command module, and their built-in redundancy
features reflected this primary control system concept.
The Block I control and display subsystem was generally revamped
and relocated on the spacecraft control panels (see Figure 7-9) as a result
of the new Block II G&C concept. The final Block II control and display sub-
system was comprised of seven devices:
Two rotational controllers
One translational controller
Two flight director attitude indicators
One gimbal position/fuel pressure indicator
One attitude set control panel
This new complement of hardware was both different in quantity and function
from its Block I counterpart as well as in the reliability requirements
established for each device. Whereas the Block I reliability requirement
for the total SCS was established as providing a probability of achieving
crew survival of 99. 99 percent and mission success of 99. 5 percent, the
Block II devices were assigned apportioned reliability values in terms of
allowable failure rates which would maintain the overall G&C reliability as
before. As a backup system now, the individual SCS device failure rates
were permitted to increase.
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BLOCK I
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ROTATION CONTROL(2) l
3B,,O s_'_ tl PE_ AXIS}
SOFI STOP _OLL
GRI_ INCtlNED I0° F,'_O
NON-Sy_ GRIP
2_ WIRES CA_L_
I
ADD DIRECT MODE l
IADD MTVCFUNCTION
TRANSL CONIROL
sv_ FOR X, Y, Z
T HANDLE
CCV¢ SW-ABORT
Cw S._-ENG OFF
NO ISOLATION RES
P,,'L,'T SW
16 WIRES 'CABLE
...........II [ADD MTVC DELETE I T/CADD P,T,T SeN O_LETE PT"T s_ADD C_C _NTEEFACE
I ROTATION CONTROL
6 B'O P,',12 Pe_ AXlS_
SOFt STOPS-ALL AXE_
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'.'.IRES,'CAB L__
ADD 12 DIRECT S',',¸
ADD _TVC
ADD r,7'T S_ ¸
_E£_ AND ELEC LOCK
T_ANSL CONTROL
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12 SW_OR X, y, Z
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CCw S','_ ABORI
C_'. S'6'-SC5 ENABLE
ISOL,_TION RESIST
36 ','.'_r ES/CA_ LE
mECH LOCK ON XYZ
FLT DIR Art qND
[I}
3 AXIS SAUL
3 ERRO_ NEEDLE5
3 ratE IND
TILT AXiS BALL
wtDO_ LIGHTING
GALVANOmETErS
FRONt _OUNTED
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RECT CASE
AGCU AND _MU SOU_Ct
ADD 3 SINGLE-
AXIS ATTITUDE
DISPLAys
DELETE AGCU/BALL INTERF
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1
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Figure 7-8. Evolution of SOS Controls and Displays
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The functions assumed by the Block II control and display devices
may be summarized as follows:
I. Functional switching of control system elements eliminated the
Block I control panel which utilized mode switching. In lieu of
this panel, 66 separate functional switches were mounted on
various spacecraft panels.
Rotational control of the spacecraft, via manual means, was still
effected with the rotational controller. However, another
redundant breakout switch per axis was added. "Soft" stops were
added in the pitch and yaw axes and IZ additional "direct _'switches
(four per axis) were added at the soft stops for direct RCS control
purposes. The hand grip was modified from a nonsymmetrical to
a symmetrical form and the longitudinal or yaw axis inclined
forward to 20 degrees from the original 10 degrees. A trigger-
type push-to-talk communications switch was added. An interface
signal to the CMC was added which permits rotation commands to
the reaction jets through CMC control.
, Translation control of the spacecraft, via manual means, was
still effected with the translational controller. However, another
set of two redundant control actuation switches per axis was
added. The clockwise rotation of the tee-handle now actuates a
switch which enables the SCS to assume the spacecraft control
functions from the PGNCS. Isolation resistors were added to pro-
vide short-circuit protection for the SCS and the CMC electronics
during translation commands. Also, the push-to-talk communica-
tion switch was removed from this device.
. Attitude display of the spacecraft is still retained in the FDAI.
However, two FDAI's are now utilized and the roll axis of the
three-axis ball was aligned with the instrument's case since the
IMU roll axis was now aligned with the spacecraft +x body axis.
Servometric meter movements were substituted for the galva-
nometric meter movements to improve accuracy and reliability
and reduce weight. Electroluminescentlighting was utilized to
better illuminate all readable features of the device. The instru-
ment is now rear-mounted on the main instrument panel. The
angular rate ranges were increased in roll to account for t}_e higher
roll-rate capability required during entry. The attitude error
needles were foreshortened to eliminate vibration susceptibility.
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Gimbal position of the service module main propulsion system is
now a separate instrument. ]Four separate servometric meter
movements are utilized--two each for the pitch and yaw axes.
During the boost phase, the four meter movements display S-II
and S-IVB fuel and oxidizer pressures. Scale illumination
utilizes electroluminescent lighting. For SCS delta-velocity
maneuvers, manual SPS engine gimbal trim capability is provided.
Desired gimbal trim angles are set in with the pitch and yaw trim
thumbwheels--these thumbwheels have a mechanical lock.
The attitude set/control panel still provides a means to select
spacecraft inertial pointing directions. However, this device is
now a separate instrument and the thumbwheel controls incorporate
mechanical locks. In Block I, the inertial (Euler) attitude error
output signals were sine functions of the difference between the
input command and the AGCU. In Block II, these Euler attitude
error signals are the result of either (I) the difference between
the IMU inertial Euler angles and the commanded Euler angles
or (2) the difference between the GDC Euler angles and the
commanded Euler angles resolved through a Euler-to-body rate
transformation.
Ball Markings
The markings of the 4-1/2-inch-dian, eter FDAI sphere and some of the
indices used to read the ball were changed during system development.
Two markers suspended in front of the ball, the reentry symbol ((_))and
the miniature aircraft symbol (_2f), were deleted. The former symbol
indicated the spacecraft stability axis during entry relative to the body
+x axis and the aircraft syn_bol indicated the spacecraft +x axis. These
symbols were used to interpret the ball during the appropriate flight modes.
When the ball was no longer used for entry roll control, the two symbols
were merged and then deleted and a lubber-line-type reference utilized.
In addition, the horizon and pitch great circles were graduated in one degree
increments per astronaut request.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the experience with the Apollo SCS controls and displays,
three conclusions are offered, all concerned with the hand controllers:
I. Provide firm specifications for crew personal preference items.
Design hand controllers as plug-in units so that cabling can be
part of spacecraft wiring.
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o Treat hand controllers as fragile items by minimizing ground use
in the spacecraft.
The first conclusion is a result of the hand controller design difficulties
during the middle time period of the program. Since subcontractors have no
way of determining the design requirements for crew personal items,
because of the subjective nature of this equipment, the specifications are
best provided by the customer.
The second and third conclusions are a result of difficulties encountered
with the hand controllers during the extensive spacecraft 101 checkout proce-
dures. This was a problem that emerged late in the program because the
earlier flights were unmanned and thus lacking in controller operational
experience.
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8.0 HARDWARE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
This section discusses the basic hardware design philosophies
embodied in those disciplines which cut across the entire complement of
SCS hardware. This includes the following areas:
Reliability
Environments
Safety
Access and maintainability
Interfaces
Electrical
Thermal
Mechanical
Packaging philosophy
Enclosures
Displays
Materials and finishes
Weight
Growth
Electromagnetic interference
Configuration control
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Quality assurance
Design quality controls
Procurement control
Control of fabricated articles
Training and certification of personnel
Testing
Development testing
Qualification testing
Acceptance testing
Installation checkout
Test tolerances
GENERAL
The general hardware design features of the Block II stabilization and
control system for the Apollo spacecraft may be characterized as follows:
1. The physical system is comprised of 14 contract end-items (CEI):
(See Figure 8-1 and Table 8-1).
One control, reaction jet, and engine on-off
One electronic control assembly
One electronic display assembly
One coupler, gyro display
One servo amplifier, thrust vector position
Two gyro assemblies
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Figure 8-1. Block II Contract End Items 
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.
.
Two indicators, attitude, flight director
One indicator, gimbal position, and fuel pressure _:-"
One control panel attitude set-':-_
One control, translation ;:-_
Two controls, rotation*
These CEI's are electrically continuous, hermetically sealed,
conduction cooled, individually mounted structures containing no
vibration isolation provisions except for the Gyro Assemblies
The packaging of hardware components into individual CEI's is
arranged for a logical functional grouping of system elements and
for ease of system malfunction isolation and troubleshooting.
The electronic assemblies are electron-beam-welded aluminum
structures, housing stacked cordwood-type modules containing
high-reliability electronic piece parts. The parts are intercon-
nected by welded sections of buss wire which also connect to
module exit headers. The modules are interconnected by welded
exit connections to buss wires sandwiched between thin film
Mylar matrix sheets. The matrix connections to external con-
nectors are by lead wires.
Approximately 15 percent of the total system electronics are
integrated circuit flatpacks which significantly reduce system
weight, volume, and power requirements.
The display panels and indicators are electron-beam-welded
aluminum structures. The indicator enclosures house
servometric-type meter movements, high- reliability electronic
piece parts, and incorporate electroluminescent-type dial face
lighting. The control panel houses high-reliability electronic
resolvers.
*No coldplate cooling
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. The hand controllers are aluminum structures incorporating a
tapered-wedge type lock/stow mounting feature. The controller
hand grip form factors and force and travel provisions are human
factored for optimum control performance in the space
environment.
. System functions which are critical to crew safety are assured by
the addition of switchable redundant circuitry.
DETAIL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The major design categories in the fabrication of the SCS included relia-
bility, environments, safety, access and maintainability, electrical,
thermal, mechanical, EMI, system interfaces, and quality assurance. A
brief summary of the design philosophy adopted for each of these areas
follows.
Reliability
The SCS reliability goals were established as a 99. 5 percent proba-
bility of achieving a lunar landing and return mission and a 99.99 percent
probability of achieving crew survival in the event of an abort. The term
"goal" was stated since there was no provision for a separate reliability
test program--the "demonstration" of system reliability was accomplished
solely by analytical means. The system was modeled with a reliability logic
diagram wherein each identifiable hardware system element was assigned a
reliability value so that, for any given control path, the product of these
values yielded the required overall reliability number. This process was
iterated until each element contained a reliability value that was thought to
be attainable in practice and the total path yielded the desired result.
The components and piece parts necessary to construct these hardware
elements were procured through rigidly controlled high-reliability part
specifications. These specifications included such requirements as
NPC 200-2 or NPC 200-3 quality control requirements, lot configuration
control or individual part serialization, special packaging and handling
requirements, specified failure rates, special 100 percent part processing
tests, special lot sampling tests for quality assurance, and/or substantia-
tion of lot integrity and qualification and failure rate verification. All of
these tests were completed prior to part utilization.
As subsystem breadboard designs were completed, the selected piece
parts were subjected to parameter variation and stress analyses so that a
parts application review could be conducted. This review between the relia-
bility engineer, design engineer, and production engineer provided a
measure of confidence that the given design could meet the reliability
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requirements as well as the producibility and specified functional and
performance requirements. Special reliability training was provided for all
cognizant personnel in Engineering, Quality Assurance, Procurement, and
Manufacturing to acquaint and motivate these personnel with the role relia-
bility was to play on the Apollo program.
Completed prototype designs were subjected to failure mode and effects
analyses. Critical failures such as single-point failures and loss of
redundancy were identified; failure modes such as probability of failure and
propagation of failures and consequent effect were identified. The elimina-
tion of undesirable failure modes was factored into the design.
A structured test program was an integral part of the design process
and from this came the only empirical data which could be used for reliabil-
ity verification. The test program was basically divided into two phases:
development and qualification. Development testing was concerned with
materials, components, and subsystems or systems. Allowable materials
were controlled by the contractor and all subcontractor materials not specif-
ically contained in the prime contractors' materials specification were sub-
ject to prior approval. Components, piece parts, and subsystems that were
designed specifically for Apollo were subjected to rigorous functional and
performance tests under standard laboratory conditions. Design problems
were worked out at this stage of development.
Formal qualification tests were performance and environmental tests
conducted on components or subsystems manufactured under production
standards to demonstrate that the production equipment meets all applicable
requirements of design and performance. The type of tests selected to
demonstrate design compliance were design-proof tests and mission-life
tests. The design-proof tests were single-environment tests at specification
limits conducted on each individual contract end item. Mission-life tests
were conducted on a complete system in two phases: ground checkout and
prelaunch and mission performance. One system was subjected to one cycle
(400 hours) of ground checkout and prelaunch and two cycles (672 hours) of
mission performance. During this test the system was exposed to vibration
and then to a salt-fog atmosphere. Off-limits tests were to have been con-
ducted on a full complement of end items from the mission-life test system
and were to be subjected to both a combined environment of high temperature
and vibration and an overvoltage test in which these parameters were
increased until a failure occurred. In the interest of cost savings, however,
NASA deleted this requirement.
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Environments
The natural and induced physical environmental extremes to which the
SCS equipment was designed were specified by individual in-house organiza-
tions skilled in these fields. Early in the Block I program, many of these
design criteria were late in being fully developed--later than was required
to support the design process of the subcontractor. Of the specified environ-
ments-temperature, pressure, humidity, corrosive contaminants, radia-
tion, ozone, vibration, acceleration, shock, and acoustic noise--only
humidity, temperature, and vibration presented specific problems to the
SCS.
In the Block I design, which utilized electronic assembly enclosures
with open sides, exposed connectors, and plug-in cards for the in-flight test
and maintenance concept, the discovery by NASA that the cabin could be
humid and salt-laden was catastrophic. This situation led to a crash effort
to find sealants and sealing techniques which would withstand the space
environment for exposed electrical connections while still retaining the
maintainability features of the design. In Block II, this condition was
alleviated by construction of hermetically sealed electronic assemblies.
The original Block I crash safety requirements for panels and displays
were specified at 78 g's, Z5 milliseconds rise time; later this requirement
was increased to 78 g's, II milliseconds rise time. Table 8-2 presents a
brief summary of the design environments. A more detailed listing is
beyond the scope of this report.
Safety
Because the SCS is particularly sensitive or critical to mission suc-
cess and crew safety, many conditions relating to these considerations were
imposed on the design. The SCS was specified to be designed to fail safe;
that is, a failure was not permitted to propagate or cause other failures or
prevent the proper performance of a redundant path. Also, the most proba-
ble failure mode should cause signals to go to a zero or null condition. The
use of failure monitor circuits required the specific approval of the contractor.
Redundancy was allowed only where single-point failures could cause loss of
the crew. Analyzing complex circuitry to demonstrate compliance to these
conditions is inherently a tedious long-term effort. As such, design changes
were required well into the program and will undoubtedly continue.
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Access and Maintainability
The SCS was designed so that no field repair, adjustment, or calibra-
tion was required within the specified life. The in-flight test and mainte-
nance concept was deleted in Block II. This was probably a prudent decision
in that the complex electronic nature of the system, the limited amount of
on-board test equipment, and the relative inexperience of astronauts as
electronic designers or test engineers precluded the probability of successful
attainment of the in-flight test capability. The only SCS items originally
classified as limited life were the BMAG's based on analyses indicating that
to meet accuracy requirements drift trim would be required at intervals
less than the 1400 hours of service life required of the system. Subsequently,
performance results showed this trim would not be necessary and the limi-
tation was removed.
Interfaces
The SCS had a direct functional and electrical interface with the
guidance and navigation, command module reaction control, service module
reaction control, service module service propulsion, entry monitor, mis-
sion sequencer, spacecraft control panel, electrical power, and spacecraft
booster fuel pressure systems (see Figure 8-2). In addition, it interfaced
physically and mechanically with the spacecraft command module structure
and electrically with the bench maintenance area ground support equipment
and prelaunch and launch automatic checkout equipment. The number of
physical and electrical interfaces involved presented a significant systems
engineering type of effort to properly and adequately integrate the SCS with
these other systems during the early definition phases of the program. As
would be expected, many incompatibilities and errors were involved both
before and after the initiation of the hardware design process.
The basic method employed to control these interfaces was the use of
an interface control drawing with the program associate contractor (viz. ,
MIT) and specification control drawings and procurement specifications with
the subcontractor. The interface controI between in-house spacecraft sys-
tem design groups was effected through normal liaison and coordination and
by means of reviewing and initialing each other's procurement documents.
Electrical
The electrical design of the Block II SCS was basically conventional in
concept. The enclosures were hermetically sealed, which precluded prob-
lems associated with humidity and arcing, explosion-proofing, and dielectric
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strength. The electronic circuitry was isolated from its associated
enclosure and the enclosure was electrically continuous to protect against
stray electromagnetic fields. The connectors were of a fully developed and
qualified conventional design. Soldering and crimping of wire were rigidly
controlled by NASA process specifications. The Block II electronic assem-
blies utilized a unique internal packaging technique. The electrical leads
emanating from the electronic piece parts contained within stacked cordwood
modules were brought up through holes in the sandwiched Mylar strips.
These leads were spotwelded to the matrix conductors on the Mylar sheets,
thus improving _lead dress, ''vibration susceptibility, and volumetric
efficiency.
Thermal
The temperature control design of the SCS was predicated upon conduc-
tion as the primary mode of heat transfer. The contractor provided thermal
coldplates with a coolant temperature range from +55 F to +127 F. To
improve heat transfer between the coldplate and an electronic assembly base-
plate because of variations in surface flatness, a special high-conductivity
grease was utilized between the two surfaces. The maximum generated
thermal flux limits were established at I watt per square inch average, and
2 watts per square inch peak. Transient heat loads were tolerated provided
the thermal capacitance of the equipment was such as to limit the tempera-
ture rise of the equipment baseplate in the locality of the hot spot to 5 F over
the nominal steady-state value within a time limit of 15 minutes. Entry
thermal control requirements specified that equipment required conduction
cooling to operate satisfactorily for the last 2-1/Z minutes of the flight oper-
ation with a linear coldplate temperature rise from +127 F to +160 F.
Mechanical
The basic mechanical design features of the Block II SCS are described
in the following paragraphs.
Packaging Philosophy
Because of the new role established for the SCS as a backup system
and because of the Block I humidity problem, the Block II SCS packaging
philosophy was completely redefined in mid-1964. Whereas the system elec-
tronic assemblies in Block I were physically configured for a rack and panel-
type mounting and each end item was functionally configured to essentially a
control axis by control-axis arrangement, the Block II assemblies were
physically configured to individually bolted-down units and were functionally
configured to designs wherein each end item essentially contained a complete
stabilization and control function. Because there were no in-flight remova-
ble subassemblies, this permitted larger modular assemblies, allowing more
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efficient packaging and the use of fewer soldered connections with a
significant weight savings. In addition, this concept permitted simplified
system checkout and troubleshooting because of the logical separation of
functions--each end item was a self-contained functional entity in itself.
Enclosures
The structural coverings or housings for the electronics were fabri-
cated of milled aluminum castings attached to a carefully machined flat
aluminum baseplate which served as the heat path for the internal electronic
components. A cast and machined aluminum top cover utilizing a gasket
seal provided a hermetic seal-type feature. The internal volume was filled
with an inert gas to provide the explosion-proofing requirement and the
moisture content within the enclosure was carefully controlled to prevent
oxidation. Electrical access to the enclosed electronics was provided via
standard, hermetically sealed connectors. The number of connectors
utilized was dictated by the philosophy that required electrical power,
analog/discrete signals, and telemetry/test points to be routed through
separate connectors (see Figures 8-3 and 8-4).
Displays
The SCS FDAI's were sealed units fabricated from machined aluminum
castings and filled with an inert gas. All dial-face markings, colors, and
illumination were rigidly controlled by North American Rockwell specifica-
tions. Numerals and letters were Gorton Nioderne and Gorton Normal,
respectively. The dial faces and certain internal mechanisms were illumi-
nated by electroluminescent lighting operating from single phase, 400 cps
power. Dimming features were provided to control light intensity _.nd color
standards were assured by use of certification laboratories.
Materials and Finishes
In an effort to standardize and thereby control the many available con-
struction materials and methods of finishing or protecting them, North
American Rockwell established, controlled, and imposed on all subcontrac-
tors their own materials specification. All materials testing and/or all
outside testing was controlled by the contractor for such parameters as
fungus-proofing, fire resistance, and outgassing. The only exceptions were
when unapproved materials were used in hermetic-sealed enclosures.
Several problems were encountered in this area, the most notable the
failure to measure flammability characteristics in a 100 percent oxygen
environment at pressures above atmospheric. Another problem centered
around the inability of the contractor to evaluate new materials submitted by
the subcontractor and notify him in a timely manner.
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W ei ght
A noted weight improvement was effected between the Block I SCS
(approximately 239 pounds) and the Block II SCS (approximately 195 pounds).
Most of this saving can be attributed to the deletion of the in-flight test and
maintenance concept which required more modules and internal connectors.
Growth
As in most systems, the Apollo SCS provided for a volumetric growth
potential of i0 percent of the initial estimated volume of the electronic
assemblies only. As is normally the case, much of this growth volume has
already been utilized in making late changes. Future programs should
allocate at least this much growth potential to preclude major redesigns so
that advances in the technology or other minor system improvements can be
made during the evolution of the system.
Electromagnetic Interference
The basic criteria utilized in the electromagnetic (EMI) design of the
SCSto suppress EMI generation and susceptibility may be summarized as
follows:
l , Wire routing or "lead dress" was carefully considered in the
design of each CEI. Power circuits were purposely routed away
from and at right angles to sensitive signal circuits wherever
possible•
Power and signal ground circuits were separated and isolated
from the chassis. Signal grounds were accumulated at one point
in the SCS and brought out to the vehicle V'holy ground" point.
, Sensitive signal circuits utilized twisted pair wiring and shielding
as necessary.
4. Power circuits utilized twisted lead wiring.
• Where possible, an attempt was made to use adjacent connector
pins for signals and signal returns.
6. Use was made of electrostatic shields around power transformers.
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7. Diode arc suppression on relay coil circuits was utilized.
. Provisions were made and space was allocated for the inclusion
of power line filters.
9. The CEI enclosures were made electrically continuous.
These basic EMI design criteria resulted in a system that was rela-
tively free from both generated noise and any susceptibility to it. This was
achieved in Block II by assigning an EMI expert to the subcontractor's
facility on a temporary basis during the initial design phases of the program.
CONFIGURATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
Configuration control for a hardware-oriented program is perhaps
the most important aspect of any program and the one element of a program
that is most consistently violated. It is a subject concerned with the basic
problem of establishing requirements, building hardware to these require-
ments, and controlling all changes thereto. When dealing with a subcontrac-
tor, as in the case of the SCS, it is even more important to a program's
success than when dealing with in-house organizations.
The Block II SCS procurement was predicated on the philosophy that
North American Rockwell would concept the system and specify the detail
performance requirements. Some of the rigors of NASA configuration control
document NPC 500-I were imposed. In addition to the normal elements of
configuration identification and accounting, changes were brought under con-
trol. A system concept was baselined at the preliminary design review
(PDR) and all Class I changes thereafter were controlled by a formal change
control system. At the critical design review (CDR), which occurs at the
90 percent drawing release point, the detail design was reviewed for com-
pliance with the requirements of the contractor's procurement specification.
Again, any Class I changes required were handled via the formal change
control system. At the completion of the first deliverable system for flight,
a first-article configuration inspection (FACI) was held. This review veri-
fied that the "as built and as tested" hardware met all specification require-
ments that testing would permit. Deviations, if any, were reviewed and
either agreed to or the hardware was fixed and retested. This system of
configuration control permits a logical and ordered evolution of a sub-
system wherein all participants in the design process work to the same
ground rules, design to the same system concept, know when changes that
would affect their efforts occur, and where management has the leverage
and visibility to control the effort.
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QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The Apollo SCS quality assurance program was conducted under the
aegis of NASA documents NPC 200-2 and NPC 200-3. These requirements,
together with the subcontractor's and contractor's quality plans, provided
the application of quality controls and assurance techniques from the begin-
ning of the design process through procurement of materials, manufacture,
assembly, acceptance and qualification testing, packaging, shipping, and
finally installation checkout of the system in the spacecraft. The major
areas of quality control and assurance were design quality controls, pro-
curement control, control of fabricated articles, training and certification
of personnel, and testing.
Design Quality Controls
Quality control participation in design activities provided a means for
transmittal of specific Apollo quality requirements to the design engineers
at an early stage of product development. Design Engineering was thus
assured that quality personnel were aware of the design control requirements
specified and that these requirements would be reflected in the quality-
control procedures at the earliest possible time.
Procurement Control
To assure that the quality and reliability requirements of the Apollo
program were achieved on all purchased materials, supplies, and services,
an Apollo procurement system \vas established. This included a procure-
ment document review to identify and specify all applicable quality require-
ments, vendor selections based on a supplier's capability to meet article
specifications, quality history, and/or a survey report, and a vendor quality
system. The procurement system also included source inspection where an
item could not be adequately and economically inspected on receipt or where
it affected safety, performance, interchangeability, or service of the final
product; receiving inspection on all items purchased; and a vendor correla-
tion program to assure early and continuous coordination and correlation
of manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment and procedure problems as
well as malfunctions, discrepancies, and failures of purchased components.
Control of Fabricated Articles
The control of fabricated articles during the manufacturing process
was effected through the use of production flow diagrams for each subassem-
bly, component, and system wherein inspection test points were determined.
Inspection procedures were written to document the requirements at each
checkpoint. Defect analysis and corrective action were accomplished
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through a failure analysis system. Lot control and serialization control of
parts were utilized to maintain identification and traceability of materials
and articles through the fabrication stage. Because of the critical nature of
the SCS, the necessity for controlled cleanliness dictated the need for
cleanroom facilities which were periodically inspected for dust contamina-
tion, temperature, and humidity. There was also periodic inspection for
adherence to specified personnel apparel, product containers, cleaning
procedures, permissible supplies, etc.
Training and Certification of Personnel
A formal training program was given to selected personnel who would
be responsible for the determination of product quality on the SCS program.
These personnel were subjected to course work such as product familiariza-
tion, test equipment familiarization, an introduction into the processing and
manufacturing techniques conceived for the Apollo Program, training in
special inspection techniques, a review of quality control methods and sys-
tems utilized by the employer, training in the basic elements of statistical
quality control, training in special manufacturing processes, and testing of
proficiency in the above.
Certification of personnel in welding, soldering, and wiring were
required of all personnel involved in these activities.
Testing
Testing of the SCS was the culmination of the quality assurance pro-
gram. It was here that concepts, requirements, design, and materials
merged into the final product which would then be demonstrated. The total
testing effort can be broken down into four distinct categories: development
tests, qualification tests, acceptance tests, and installation checkout tests.
Development Testing
The development tests were a series of functional, environmental, and
engineering evaluation tests conducted on inaterials, parts, and components
to determine the suitability of the items for incorporation in the SCS to
determine their performance characteristics and to evaluate and improve
designs. These tests included such activities as:
I. Determination of part, component, and subassembly
characteristics
2. Comparative tests to aid in the selection of materials and parts
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Evaluation in terms of critical environment including anticipated
or unknown amplification factors due to the particular application
4. Determination of performance stability or repeatability
5. Evaluation of changed or improved designs
6. Design margin tests
7. Parameter variation tests.
The subcontractor was authorized five complete engineering systems
in both Block I and Block II to develop flyable configuration hardware. In
Block I the contractor attempted to enforce configuration control on these
development systems. In retrospect, this concept was not useful to the
program, helpful to the subcontractor, or even practical from a design
standpoint. On Block II it was abandoned as a viable method to develop a
system; instead, the more orderly approach of establishing a design base-
line followed up with formal design reviews was instituted.
Qualification Testing
The qualification tests were a series of performance and environ-
mental tests conducted on production piece part, end item, and system
hardware to demonstrate that the items met all applicable requirements of
design and performance.
Materials were qualified by the contractor and listed in an approved
materials specification which the subcontractor utilized. Where new
materials were selected, the subcontractor conducted these tests and sub-
mitted both test results and samples of the material to the contractor for
approval. Electronic piece parts were procured from vendors by means
of ridigly controlled high-reliability part specifications. Each specification
contained a section that delineated the testing requirements for these parts.
This included the following sequential series of tests:
io i00 Percent Processing Tests - Visual inspection, high tempera-
ture, constant acceleration, temperature cycle, gross and fine
leak tests, particle detection, burn-in, and X-ray.
Group A Acceptance Tests - Group A I00 percent tests, visual
inspection, mechanical inspection, and basic electrical parame-
ters. Group A sample tests included high-temperature leakage,
low-temperature gain, offset voltage, and dynamic resistance.
- 122 -
SD 68-869
SPACE DIVISION ov NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
. Group B Lot Integrity Tests - Visual inspection, mechanical
inspection, solderability, temperature cycling, thermal shock,
moisture resistance, shock, vibration, constant acceleration,
terminal strength, salt atmosphere, high-temperature life, and
lO00-hour operating life test.
The qualification testing of completed end items and the system was
divided into two major areas: design proof tests, system life tests. The
design proof tests were climatic and dynamic environments imposed on one
each of an operating end-item to specification limits. The syste_ or mis-
sion life tests were exposures of one complete complement of operating end
items (or a system) to first vibration and then a salt fog atmosphere. All of
these tests were preceded by a checkout test to establish baseline perform-
ance data and then the environments sequenced to optimize time and facilities
utilization. Performance data was taken during and after these te:;ts to
demonstrate that the SCS met all the applicable requirements of design and
performance and to ascertain that no serious design weaknesses exist that
could cause inconsistent or marginal performance or high probability of
failure.
Acceptance Testing
Acceptance of completed SCS hardware by the contractor required that
acceptance tests, both at the end-item and system levels, be successfully
accomplished prior to shipment. Successful accomplishment was defined as
a Quality Control-witnessed test conducted with a contractor-approved
acceptance test procedure (ATP) wherein all test parameters measured fell
within the specified tolerance limits. Parameters which were outside of
these tolerance limits could be submitted as a waiver request which required
contractor approval prior to shipment of the hardware. The ATP's specified
the detailed steps which the test operator must perform in the conduct of
the test, the configuration of the test articles, and any test equipment used
to perform the test. They detailed the step-by-step settings to be made,
the readings to be taken, the acceptable limits for each reading, and instruc-
tions for recording data. The data sheets on which these data were recorded
were made a part of the end-item data package which accompanied each end
item and system throughout its service life.
Installation Checkout
As envisioned early in the Apollo Program, all hardware received
from the subcontractor would undergo a receiving inspection test at the
contractor's facility. Prior to the receipt of the initial hardware, however,
this concept was abandoned and arriving hardware was installed directly
into the spacecraft. The role of the contractor was to demonstrate through
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test the continued functional and performance capability of the system when
mated physically and electrically with actual spacecraft interfacing sys-
tems. The basic philosophy adopted for these tests was, first, to verify
that the system itself operated properly in the spacecraft structure and with
spacecraft power applied via the spacecraft interconnecting wire harness.
All functions and modes were exercised to established performance require-
ments within allowable tolerance limits. Second, electrical and functional
interface compatibility between the given system and the interfacin_ systems
was to be demonstrated. These tests demonstrated polarity, phasing,
switching, scaling, and gain compliance to the /\}J_llo _equirements.
NASA-supplied automatic checkout equipment (ACE) was utilized for
testing all spacecraft systems. This ACE hardware had the capability to
inject stimuli and accept signal-conditioned readouts for a large number of
systems simultaneously. This precluded the normal troubleshooting tech-
niques of past programs wherein each system had its own time on the
vehicle and its own test consoles with their capability for stimuli, readout,
and numerous test points for probing suspected trouble areas.
Test Tolerances
Test tolerances utilized in acceptance-test documents to accept
finished hardware represents an area of the design process which has not
generally been given the attention it properly deserves. Those tolerances
are normally the sole criteria and the only tangible evidence offered to a
buyer that the accepted hardware will, in fact, meet the requirements
imposed on it. Most equipment requirements specify that the hardware
will perform in some given manner, over a specified service life, and when
exposed to stated environmental extremes. The acceptance-test demonstra-
tion of these requirements usually omits the servi_e life and environmental
parameters and concentrates on the performance aspects by conducting
tests which yield results that are adjudged by a set of _o-no-go values or
tolerance limits. How these tolerance limits are <_stablished and what
rationale is used to generate them is _enerally unknown.
Traditionally, test tolerances have been generated in one of several
ways. One method merely utilizes a fixed or variable percentage above
and below the nominal value. Another method is the use of worst case
values. This technique is more rigorous but overly conservative with
regard to stochastic quantities. Few designs can afford the weight and cost
penalties associated with this concept. Still another, and currently more
popular method, is the RSS technique. This system is more statistically
rigorous than the worst case method in that all error sources and their
probable range of error are identified. However, the amount of probability
associated with this error range is assumed to be associated with a normal
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distribution. One could argue that, in the average item of hardware being
tested, there are many individual and uncorrelated piece parts with perhaps
unknown error distributions (probability density functions), but that the net
summation of these stochastic quantities when working together tends toward
a normal or Guassian distribution of error for the total signal path under
test. This is approximately true except that one cannot then accurately
specify the amount of probability contained between the upper and lower test
limits. However, this is precisely what is required frown a test program.
To eliminate these omissions and to establish a set of tolerance limits that
is supported by a mathematically rigorous process, the Apollo SCS sub-
contractor developed a tolerance analysis program that would account for all
of the aforementioned factors.
This tolerance analysis program (TAP) determined a set of end-item
acceptance test tolerances which would guarantee that the end-of-life
requirements on the SCS were met at all times. In addition, each tolerance
was supported by a mathematical derivation of how it was obtained and
showed the allowances made for manufacturing tolerances, age, environment,
and test equipment. To determine the various tolerances, system perform-
ance was traced back to the performance of each piece part within the SCS
and the appropriate "sensitivities" associated with those piece parts were
obtained. The effects of manufacturing tolerances, age, and environment
on each piece part were used to statistically predict the effect on the system
from each source. This system effect was then compared with the require-
ment to determine if satisfactory end-of-life performance could be expected
(probability of performance within the requirement of 0.997 was deemed
satisfactory). If it could not meet the requirement, tighter test tolerances
were used to modify the statistical prediction (narrow the selection of
acceptable systems) until the requirement was met. The following sum-
marizes the salient features of this program:
lo Probability density functions (PDF) were obtained for each piece
part in the SCS from manufacturer's data, in-house data, etc.
Analyses were performed to obtain performance and sensitivity
equations and use was made of the convolution process.
. The service-life cycle of each specification requirement was
simulated on a digital computer using the sensitivity equations and
convolution. The PDF's were accurately combined (convolved)
and the errors from the various sources were iterated until the
resultant test tolerances guaranteed that the mission-time-
extreme-environment requirements would be met with a probability
of 0. 997.
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The sensitivity analysis effort was performed in two steps: first, to
obtain circuit (building block) performance in terms of piece parts; and
second, to obtain system (performance path) performance in terms of build-
ing blocks and hence performance path (system) performance in terms of
piece parts. The primary reason for using sensitivity analysis (first-order
terms of a Taylor's series expansion of performance equations which
describe the building block or performance path) is that the exact perform-
ance equations, although attainable in theory, are too difficult to deal with in
practice. The sensitivities (Taylor's coefficients evaluated at nominal
values) can be easily obtained with a computer without having an explicit
performance equation for the parameters--having the hardware described
by a system of equations (e.g., node or loop equations) is quite enough.
This sensitivity analysis process is best described in mathematical
form as follows:
Let
XZ, '" X ) be a performance equation (1)Z = f (XI' ' n
where
Z : circuit or performance path output
X°
1
th
i component contributing to performance of the circuit or
performance path
and
i
Z : f l be the function evaluated at its nominal value
o [ nominal
where
o subscript denotes nominal value.
Hence
<<)dZ = Of dX I + dX g + '" + dXn =
o o
(z)
i 8<--_i1 dX. 1
i=l o
(3)
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and
or
_ . + X Z1 Xl 2
O O
01-8-Xn" Xnlo dxnxn
o
(4)
(5)
where
dZ
-- = relative error of Z or the PDF of Z
Z
O
= sensitivity of Z to X. evaluated at nominal conditions
1
(dXi-_ = relative error of X. or the PDF of X..
ldXi__
The terms \-_i / are stochastic quantities (i. e., they are not deter-
ministic} and as such must be represented by either a frequency distribution
or a probability density function (PDF}. It will be noted that these terms
are summed (Equation {5)) and the mathematical process of finding the PDF
of the sum of random variables is known as convolution. For example,
let X and Y be two independent random variables whose individual values
are represented by x and y, respectively, and whose probability density
functions are f(x) and g{y), respectively. Form the stochastic sum
Z=X+Y
Z is also a random variable whose individual values can be denoted by z
and whose probability density function can be denoted by h(z). It is desired
- 127 -
SD 68-869
SPACE DIVISION ov NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
to find the PDF h(z) from the PDF's f(x) and g(y). The process for finding
h(z) is called convolution and is normally symbolized by
h(z) = fix) , g(y).
For continuous variables this is written in integral form as
2
A computer program was prepared to store data and execute the cal-
culations indicated above. The goal of this program was to establish test
tolerances for the end items which would guarantee that the system would
meet all specification requirements. To make this guarantee, it was nec-
essary to make allowances for the effects of [nterchangeability (manufacturing
tolerances) of end items, aging, environment, and tester errors. In addition,
the rejection rate for each of the end-item tests was predicted (i.e. , the
yield the manufacturer could expect from completed end items was predicted).
One of the major concerns in any program is the confidence level
attained by those who must make the judgment that a system is flight ready
based on test results. Perhaps no quantitative measure will ever instill a
confidence level of 100 percent. However, the convolution technique offers
a means whereby a quantitative value can be generated which would, perhaps,
assist in this process. This calculated quantity has been coined the
"Acceptance Probability Density Function" and represents the combined
probability density of the hardware being tested and the test equipment
utilized to test the hardware. In effect, this PDF eliminates the uncertainty
in test results because of the masking effect of the test equipment. From
this PDF, one can read out the probabilities of good hardware being
accepted and rejected and the probabilities of bad hardware being accepted
and rejected. From these quantities, one may ascertain the probability that
accepted hardware is, in fact, good--this is a measure of confidence in the
test results.
An example may better illustrate this point. Assume f(x) and g(e), as
shown below, to be uniform PDF's of the hardware and the tester, respec-
tively. Further, assume the specification limits for good hardware to be
U = 0.04 (upper limit) and L = -0. 05 (lower limit)
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I
-0.08
A=I.O
1 I I I I 1
r (x)
J 1 I
1
0.14
g (e) 1
1 I
v
0 0.06"-x -0.02 0 0.05 e
When convolved these PDF's yield the Acceptance Probability Density
Function a(x) shown below:
A = 0" 107 __'_r_ _A_/_=_0//4_9/_5/4
-0.08
BAD LOWER _
a (x)
1
/_ J ,le_---A= 0.122
-0.05 0 0.04 0.06Wx
LJ= GOOD  -lu '- BAD UPPER
CROSS HATCHED AREA = ACCEPTED
NONCROSS HATCHED AREA = REJECTED
The corresponding acceptance and rejection probabilities are tabulated below:
Items Accepted Rejected Total
Good 0.495 0.148 0.643
Bad (upper) 0.020 0.122 0.143
Bad (lower) 0.107 0.107 0.214
Totals 0.622 0.378 1.000
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A measure of confidence level may be calculated as:
P {accepted unit is good) P{ good units accepted}
= P {accepted units}
0. 495
0. 643
- 0.769
This states that there is a 76.9 percent probability that all of the units
accepted are, in fact, good units.
PROBLEMS
Materials Flammability
Initially there was a failure to measure materials flammability charac-
teristics in a i00 percent oxygen environment at pressures above atmos-
pheric. The solution was materials testing under ground checkout conditions
and to change spacecraft materials which did not meet these requirements.
Thermal Conduction
The flatness of the electronic assembly baseplate was not sufficient to
provide good thermal conduction with the coldplate. The solution was to pro-
vide a tighter and more definitive flatness requirement and develop a better
application of thermal grease. The initial method of grease application left
spaces between the two surfaces after the assembly had been clamped down.
A grease-application procedure was developed that provided for the grease
to smear during application of the clamp-down pressures.
Service Life
The original service life requirements for the SCS were specified as
1000 hours of ground checkout and 400 hours for flight. These values were
based on the best estimates available at the time. The 400 hours for flight
represent a typical 14-day lunar mission which is still a good estimate.
However, the 1000-hour ground checkout estimate has proven to be too
small.
The subcontractor normally consumes between 300 to 400 hours prior
to end-item selloff considering that power is applied to lower level assemblies
and each subsequent higher level subassembly through end item selloff. The
contractor then proceeds to conduct system and combined systems tests both
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at the manufacturing facility and at the launch facility. It became evident
that the system must be qualified to a higher than specified service life.
This requalification process has begun with a goal of 9500 hours. To date,
the testing is about one-half completed with no significant failures or per-
formance degradations apparent.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions summarize the more important fallouts
occurring during the SCS hardware design and development process:
. Establish firm baseline functional and performance requirements
before the start of the hardware design process. This will pre-
clude many changes, provide better configuration control, and
materially reduce design and development costs.
Extend system qualification life testing to hardware wearout.
This provides a measure of confidence that the infant mortality
point has been passed and what reasonable service life one can
expect from the hardware as designed.
. Provide a house vehicle which is at all times maintained in a
current configuration to investigate interface, functional, per-
formance usage, and operational problems. This will minimize
surprises during the initial operational phases of a program.
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9. 0 TECHNICAL CONTENT SUMMARY
This section provides a summary listing of the report highlights. The
page numbers after each item refers to the item's location in the body of the
report.
Environmental and performance requirements as related to
hardware design:
Page
Total system
Attitude reference subsystem
Thrust vector control subsystem
Attitude reference subsystem
Entry control subsystem
Controls and display subsystem
9, Ii0
25
42
58
74
90
• Tradeoffs and design decisions:
In-flight maintenance
Reference subsystem tradeoffs and decisions
Hydraulic versus electromechanical actuator
Reaction jet size
10
26
51
75
• Failure, malfunction, and near-miss incidents:
Electric connector s
Single-point failures
13
14
• Unique problems encountered, and how solved or circumvented:
±50 percent clutch gain variations
Body bending data variation
Effect of low-g propellant slosh
47
48
66
• New concepts and hardware that evolved:
Pseudo-rate feedback
Attitude gyro coupling unit
Manual TVC
Magnetic clutch actuator
Tolerance analysis
Voltage sensitive one- shot
57
25
42
41
124
66
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Major design changes and evolution:
Block I - Block II
TVC redesigns
Manual TVC
Major design changes _'if one had it to do over again":
Establish baseline requirements
Incorporate built-in redundancy with hermetic
seals initially
Utilize standard connectors
Develop single-point failure analysis methodology
Less-sensitive TVC design
Better method of obtaining vehicle data
Obtain firm specification for crew personal-
preference iten_s
Provide house spacecraft
Qualify systenn for longer service life
Unforseen perforn_ance restrictions:
Time constraints on alignn_ent and n_aneuver times
Deleted Block I boost abort requirement in SCS
Fflod e
Page
18
48
42
131
20
20
20
52
52
i00
131
131
33
48
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APPENDIX A
SCS HAND CONTROL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
CONTROL, TRANSLATION (T/C)
The translation control shall incorporate the following in its design:
I . Locking device - Provide an index-finger actuated mechanical lock
to prevent inadvertant actuation of translation commands, which is
equipped with a visual indication denoting locked condition. The
locking mechanism shall not lock out CW or CCW handle motion.
Connecting cable - Provide an interface with the spacecraft wiring
by means of a connector installed at the terminal end of a control
cable.
o Actuation - The translation control force and displacement charac-
teristics and nominal switch actuation points shall be as shown in
Figure A-I. The rotary displacement of the control handle, meas-
ured from the null (center) position, shall be 17 i Z degrees and
shall require a torque of 15 i 5 inch-pounds. The breakout torque
shall be 6.0 inch-pounds nominal. At the point of switch actuation
the internal torque on the handle shall drive the handle toward the,
full rotary displacement position. The switches shall be in an
actuated condition when the handle is in the full rotary displacement
position. An applied torque of 15 i 5 inch-pounds shall be required
to rotate the handle out of the full rotary displacement position to
return it to center.
CONTROL, ROTATION (R/C)
The rotation control shall be a center-pivot operated grip control with
control motion analogous to the desired vehicle rotation as a design goal. The
controller shall satisfy the following requirements:
l, Controller forces - The torque versus degrees deflection shown in
Figures A-2, A-3, and A-4 represent the required force character-
istics in pitch, roll, and yaw axes, respectively. These character-
istics include breakout, gradient, soft stops, and maximum forces.
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When measured in an increasing force direction, the force shall
meet the force versus displacement requirements of Figures A-Z,
A-3, and A-4 within the displacement tolerances of Figure A-5.
When measured in a decreasing force direction, the force shall
not be less than 55 percent of the force measured in the increasing
force direction.
.
°
,
.
.
,
.
Control deflections - The total deflection for pitch, roll, and yaw
shall be as shown in Figure A-5. The soft stops shall be encountered
at ±10 degrees and the hard stops at ±11. 5 degrees in all axes.
Controller axes - The axes shall be as shown in Figure A-6. They
are pitch pivot at palm of hand, yaw pivot through hand perpendicular
to pitch pivot, roll pivot 4.0 inch belo_ pitch pivot.
Controller axes relative location
a. Controller axes versus pilot axes - The controller axes, as
shown in Figure A-6, at their installed position, shall be aligned
relative to the corresponding pilot labeled vehicle axes so that
the input axes are obvious.
bo Controller axes versus centerline of armrest - The normal
position of the yaw axis shall be such that the vertical angle
between this axis and the centerline of the armrest is ii0
degrees ±5 de_rees to allow for normal positioning of the hand.
Direct and pulse mode switches - These switches shall be actuated
at the control travel given in Figure A-5. There shall be one
switch closure provided for in each polarity of each control axis.
Emergency direct mode switches - These switches shall be provided
in each polarity of each control axis. They shall be actuated between
the soft and hard stops at the control travel given in Figure A-5.
Hand grip - The desired hand grip shape shall be as shown on
Drawing MSC SD.-AE-000681, Revision C (Apollo Control Handle).
This number is identical to Honeywell SK 87987.
Press-to-talk switch - This switch shall be a hermetically sealed,
momentary contact switch capable of switching 28 vdc into a 250 ma
resistive load. The press-to-talk switch shall be located for index
finger actuation on the forward centerline of the grip as viewed by
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the astronaut.
characteristics shall be as follows:
The press-to-talk switch actuating force and travel
a. Travel prior to switch actuation
b. Travel past switch actuation
c. Travel to hard stop
d. Torque at breakout
5 degrees minimum
8 degrees minimum
25 degrees maximum
0. 2 pound-inch
minimum
,
I0.
li.
e° Torque to reach hard stop I. 0 pound-inches
maximum
Locking device - A quick release locking device, which is equipped
with a visual indication denoting locked condition, shah be provided
to prevent accidental activation of the rotation control.
Connecting cable - Interface with the spacecraft wiring by means of
a connector installed at the terminal end of a control cable shall
be provided.
Mechanical strength - The control shall withstand without signifi-
cant effects, the indicated forces applied in the manner and under
the conditions stated below:
a, Normally or inadvertently locked configuration:
(I) A force of 200 pounds, in either direction, applied
through the pitch axis and parallel to the forearm.
(2) A force of 150 pounds applied in any direction through the
intersection of the pitch and yaw axes.
(3) A torque of 130 pound-inches applied in either direction
about an axis parallel to the forearm and through the
intersection of the pitch and yaw axis.
(4) A torque of 200 pound-inches applied in either direction
about the pitch axis and about the yaw axis.
b. Unlocked configuration:
The same forces and torques applied as in {a) above except that
a(4) should be changed to read, "A torque of 300 pound-inches
applied in either direction about the pitch axis and 250 pound-
inches applied in either direction about the yaw axis. "
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Figure A-I. Translation Control, Displacement Versus Forces--
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Figure A-Z. Rotation Control Torque Versus Displacement (Roll Axis)
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Figure A-3. Rotation Control Torque Versus
Displacement (Pitch Axis)
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Figure A-4. Rotation Control Torque Versus
Displacement (Yaw Axis)
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Figure A-5. Rotation Controller Roll Pitch and Yaw Movements
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CONTROLLER
ROLL AXIS
Figure A-6. Rotation Control Axis Orientation
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ACE
ACS
AGCU
ARS
AS/CP
AS/GPD
ATP
BMAGS
B/O
B/U
CCW
CDR
CDU
CEI
CM
CMC
CSM
CW
DECA
APPENDIX B
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Automatic Checkout Equipment
Attitude Control Subsystem
Attitude Gyro Coupler Unit
Attitude Reference Subsystem
Attitude Set Control Panel
Attitude Set/Gimbal Position Display
Acceptance Test Procedure
Body-Mounted Attitude Gyros
Breakout
Backup
Counterclockwise
Critical Design Review
Coupling Display Unit
Contract End Item
Command Module
Command Module Computer
Command Service Module
Clockwise
Display Electronic Control Assembly
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DOF
ECA
ECLSS
ECS
EDA
E/L
EMI
EMS
FACI
FDAI
GA
G&C
G&N
GDC
OP/FPI
GSE
IFM
IMU
LM
LOI
MA
MIT
Degree of Freedom
Electronic Control Assembly
Environment Control and Life Support System
Entry Control Subsystem
Electronic Display Assembly
Electroluminescence
Electromagnetic Interference
Entry Monitor System
First Article Configuration Inspection
Flight Director Attitude Indicator
Gyro Assembly
Guidance and Control
Guidance and Navigation
Gyro Display Coupler
Gimbal Position/Fuel Pressure Indicator
Ground Support Equipment
In-Flight Maintenance
Inertial Measurement Unit
Lunar Module
Lunar Orbit Insertion
Mercury Atlas
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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MTBF
MTVC
NR
P/T/T
p-p
P
PDF
PDR
PGNCS
R
R/C
RCS
RGP
RJC
RJD
S-II
S-IVB
SC
SCS
SM
SPS
SW
TAP
Mean Time Between Failure
Manual Thrust Vector Control
North American Rockwell Corporation
Push To Talk
Peak to peak
Pitch
Probability Density Function
Preliminary Design Review
Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
Roll
Rotation Controller
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Package
Reaction Jet Control
Reaction Jet Driver
Saturn Second-Stage Boost Vehicle
Saturn Third-Stage Boost Vehicle
Spacecraft
Stabilization and Control System
Service Module
Service Propulsion System
Switch
Tolerance Analysis Program
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r/c
TM
TVC
TVSA
Y
AV
Translation Controller
Telemetry
Thrust Vector Control
Thrust Vector Servo Amplifier
Yaw
Delta Velocity
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APPENDIX C
NEW TECHNOLOGY
After a diligent review of the work performed under this contract,
no new innovation, discovery, improvement, or invention was made.
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